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Part 1

A Model of

Community Problem Solving

— i -.

- 2 ­
There are a number of ways in which attempts to cope with water resource

problems can be approached. One way which will be explored here is to d^srelop

a model of community problem solving which is general, i.e., which cuts across

the variety of community problems, but at the same time has explanatory power

in understanding specific problems -- water related ones. What will be out­

lined here is a model of community decision making which has sufficient

generality to apply to a number of communities. In addition, the model

centers on the exercise of social power.

The Model:

Community Structural Variables

and the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

The exercise of social power does not occur in a vacuum. When examining

social power in any system, one must consider the relationship of this phenom­

enon to other system properties and to factors that impinge upon the system

from its environment. The assumption that the nature, distribution, struc­

ture, and exercise of power in a system is related to intra- and inter-systemic

variables is the central foundation of this study.

At the community level of analysis, various dimensions of the "power

structure1' would appear to be affected by community structural variables. For

example, the structure of a community may influence such factors as who in

the community has power; what institutional and organizational units are

represented in the "power structure;" the interrelationship among the power

actors; how power is exercised; what conditions existent in the community are

perceived and defined by the power actors as problems; and what structure of

action the power actors employ to ameliorate these defined problems. While
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we will not be utilizing these same terms, we will be considering similar

questions in the following pages-

The model is concerned with the relationships between four general sets

of variables, or "dimension-sets": (1) community structural variables, (2)

characteristics of the "leadership pool11 of the community, (3) variables

related to the "leadership pool's" perception and definition of community

problems, and (4) variables related to the types of community action that

are proposed by the "leadership pool" to assuage these problems. This model

i s

 processual. It posits, as shown in Figure I, that community structural

variables will affect the characteristics of

Figure I

A PROCESSUAL MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

III 
Community Definition and 
Structural Perception of 
Characteristics Community Problems 
II IV

Characteristics of Types of

the Leadership Pool Community

Action

the "leadership pool" (A). Furthermore, the characteristics of the "leadership

pool" will influence what, how, and why certain conditions existent in the

community are perceived and defined as problems (B). Finally, the nature of

these community problem definitions will effect the types of action proposed

by the "leadership pool" to correct these problems (C) . The model is also

concerned with perception. What is the nature of the perception and definition

of problems, how do various problem definitions differ, what do they share in
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common, does the "leadership pool" perceive problems that are objectively

present in the community, etc,? Therefore, in this study we will not te

concerned with questions relevant to the exercise of power per se. While

questions such as, nhow does the 'leadership pool" influence decisions?" are

interesting and legitimate, at this time we will be concerned solely with the

"leadership pool's" definition of problems and its proposals for action.

In this section we will present the first two dimension-sets in the

model. We will be concerned specifically with the structural dimensions,

i.e., the community structural variables and the characteristics of the

leadership pool. These dimensions will be defined and the specific variables

included in each set will be examined and operationally defined. Furthermore,

justification for the inclusion of the variables on empirical and/or theo­

retical grounds will be given. Finally, illustrative propositions interre­

lating these two sets of variables will be posed.

Community Structural Variables

The first set of dimensions in the model are those relevant to the

structure of the community. The relationship between the structure of a

community and the processes and patterns of behavior to be found in it has

been an issue of theoretical and empirical concern for many years.

The number of structural variables that could be included in the model

is manifold. We will consider only those structural elements of the community

that would appear to effect the distribution, structure, and exercise of

social power in the community. The selection of these elements is deductively

based upon previous theoretical or empirical works. In addition, a certain

amount of "face validity" is evident in the selection.
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The variables included in our model are population size, demographic

heterogeneity, community autonomy, governmental structure, organizational

density, economic heterogeneity (economic base), and social class. It should

first be noted that these variables are only relevant to comparative studies

within the United States; there are no cross-cultural variables included in

the model. With the increasing scale of society, the national cultural com­

ponents are somewhat controlled. If the model was applied to communities in

different cultural settings, these variables would have to be included. Also,

if communities in different regional areas of the United States were to be

compared, the regional variables should also be considered.

Let us now turn to a brief discussion of each of these variables. We

will attempt to more explicitly define these concepts, offer justification for

their inclusion in the model, and propose possible operational indicators for

each of them.

A. Population Size and Rate of Growth

The relationship between the size of the population in any system and

other properties of the system has long been an issue of theoretical and

empirical concern. Generally, it is assumed that an increase in the number

of inhabitants in a system, in this case the community, leads to increasing

structural differentiation. Many examples of the relationship of size to

other elements of the community could be offered. With increasing size the

system is faced with providing additional and expanded services to the

community. Additional strain is placed upon those elements of the community

concerned with such functions as social control, socialization, mutual

support, and general system integration. With increasing numbers of inhabi­

tants, the provision of general services, such as streets, sewers, parks,
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sanitation, utilities, etc* becomes problematic. Local government is faced

with the problem of increasing these services, as well as being confronted

with other issues such as an increasing need for zoning, larger police and

fire departments, traffic congestion and transportation flow, etc. Other

elements of the community, such as the school system, production-distribution­

consumption subsystem, the financial, health, and religious institutions,

etc., also face problems regarding the distribution of services and increased

functional requisites. In sum, the resultant structural differentiation

associated with increasing size affects all the elements of the community

system.

It would appear that the population size of a community would also

affect the distribution and structure of power in the system. The structure

of power in a small, rural, mid-western service town is obviously different

than that in New York City. With increasing size, structural elaboration

and differentiation, it would appear that the power structure would be more

pluralistic. Furthermore, the government and political institutions would

apparently play major roles in the local power complex due to an increase in

the demands for governmental services, increased size of the governmental

bureaucracy, and more numerous full-time political roles.

While size can be posed as a crucial structural variable, we must make

one qualification. It appears to us that growth rates may actually be a more

sensitive, precise indicator than size of increasing structural differentia­

tion. For the size variable to be meaningful, large differences in community

size must be examined; a difference in community size of one to five thousand,

for example, may not entail large differences in structural differentiation

among comparative communities. Communities of basically the same size may,
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however, have very different growth rates. These differences in the growth

rates could have serious implications for the distribution and structure of

power, A city with a growth rate of 40 percent faces different types of

problems and stresses than one with a rate of 4 percent, even though they are

of similar size! In the former, massive strain is placed upon local insti­

tutions to provide services to the proportionately larger population. The

demands on local government become particularly pressing as such "mundane11

concerns as the extension of sewer and water lines, street improvements,

zoning, etc., suddenly become major issues. Furthermore, with a large rate

of growth, other areas, particularly business and industry, may expand. The

increased rate of growth and structural differentiation may lead to fracturing

of the old normative order as new life styles and values are intruded upon

the community. A community in such a state of increasing scale would appear

to foster a pluralistic power structure, in which power would tend to be

confined to specific institutional areas and the exercise of power would take

place through exchange and coalition formation. It would appear, therefore,

that controlling for size, the greater the rate of population growth, the more

pluralistic the power structure.

B. Demographic Heterogeneity

Demographic heterogeneity refers to the degree to which the population

of a community is divided along ethnic, and particularly in the latter

twentieth century, racial lines- The greater the number of racial and ethnic

groups, the greater the demographic heterogeneity. The distribution, struc­

ture, and exercise of power in a community would appear to be influenced by

the degree of heterogeneity in the population. We previously noted that one

of the bases of social power was subsystem solidarity. When the population

of a community is heterogenous, this base may become a valuable resource for

potential power actors. Particularly in communities where subcultures and

subgroups are socially visible and organized, they and their spokesmen may

become important actors in the leadership pool. The rise of certain ethnic

groups to positions of leadership in the political and economic institutions

in American cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries is an obvious

example. Currently, the "Black Movement11 is attempting to alter the distri­

bution and structure of power not only in the local community, but in the

larger society as well. Of course, cleavages in the community associated

with demographic heterogeneity facilitate the development of conflict, as

groups attempt to realize their vested interests in the system. Due, there­

fore, to the expansion of the resource of subsystem solidarity, we would

propose that the greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the

more pluralistic or decentralized the decision-making structure.

C. Community Autonomy

There is an increasing concern in sociology with the relationship of

community autonomy to other elements of the community system. Two related

notions are implied in these discussions. First, there is the proposition

that with the increasing scale of our society, the spread of vast organizational

networks throughout the land, increased federal and state financing of local

community projects, development of regional and national markets, etc., local

people have become unable to determine the goals, policies, and operations

of local community units. The local community is now dependent upon external

sources, such as state governments and central offices which make key decisions

affecting the life of the community. The growing number of ties between the

local community and non-local units and networks is viewed as having weakened
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local community integration. As the community is drawn into the larger society,

the local unit ceases to be a viable, decision-making entity.

There is, however, a second, related use of the concept of autonomy.

The term may be applied to the degree of functional autonomy at the local

level. The question in this case is the extent to which local community insti­

tutions perform requisite functions having locality relevance. The issue

concerns, if you will, the viability of the local institutions. A local govern­

mental institution could be viewed as autonomous if it provided essential

services and performed crucial functions for the community system as the local

level. A nonautonomous, or dependent, nonviable governmental institution,

however, would be one which provided fewer services and functions. As a

result, the local community residents would have to go elsewhere for these

services. Obviously, if a local government does not provide parks, child-

welfare services, hospital services, police and fire protection, etc., it is a

less viable, autonomous institution than one that does. The autonomy of the

economic institution can be similarly examined by measuring the extent to which

it performs vital functions for the relevant locality, such functions as

providing jobs for the local population.

Local autonomy, therefore, involves the ability of local individuals,

groups, and organizations to determine the goals, policies, and operations of

the community, and the existence of viable, functionally-autonomous, locally

based institutions. As a structural variable, the degree of local autonomy

would apparently affect the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in

the community. Increasing non-local involvement and lessening functional-

autonomy would alter many of the bases of social power, such as control over

wealth, the media, jobs, knowledge and specialized skills, manpower and
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control of organizations, and control over the interpretation of values*

Furthermore, new resources and sanctions are introduced with increasing

vertical ties to the larger society. These provide new and enlarged bases

of social power.

Absentee-ownership has often been used as an indicator of autonomy.

Clark has proposed that the degree of absentee-ownership is directly related

to the distribution of power. He notes the withdrawal from community

affairs by the executives of these corporations, and proposed that the greater

the number of absentee-owned enterprises in the community, the more decentral­

ized the decision-making structure.

In many communities -- particularly the smaller,

functionally unspecialized ones -- if a single sector domi­

nates community decision making, it tends to be the econom­

ic sector. Within the economic sector, it is the owners or

managers of the largest locally owned and managed enter­

prises who tend to dominate. Consequently, factors leading

to a decrease in the (instrumental) community-wide activities

of executives of local enterprises tend to lead to a more

decentralized decision-making structure. Absentee-ownership

is one important factor in the noninvolvement of executives

from large enterprises, which in turn influences the community

decision-making structure.

Recently, conceptual and empirical studies have directly considered the

relationship of autonomy to the distribution of power. Warren has posed a

negative relationship between local autonomy and a broad distribution of

community decision-making power. He notes that autonomy denotes local control

over maximally localized institutions. "In operation, it would take the

form of the least possible absentee-ownership and in general the fewest possi­

ble organizational ties, both in the economy and in other sectors, to more

3
inclusive organizations outside the community. The less autonomous the

community, the broader the distribution of local power.
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Walton empirically found the same relationship in a study of fifty-five

communities. He found that the presence of absentee-owned corporations,

competitive party politics, adequate economic resources and satellite status

are positively related with the presence of competitive power structures•

Walton proposed that each of these variables reflects the interdependence

of the community and extracoramunity centers of power, i.e., they are indi­

cators of autonomy. Therefore, he offers the proposition that "to the extent

that the local community becomes increasingly interdependent with respect to

extra-community institutions ... the structure of local leadership becomes

more competitive.

Thus, there is substantial justification in the literature for including

the autonomy variable in our model. The crucial issue, however, is to isolate

what elements of the concept have the greatest utility for our model* The

concept of autonomy encompasses many variables; it is an "open11 concept. It

would appear, however, that limiting the concept to the economic and govern­

mental-political institutions would be valuable. The structures of these two

institutional areas are crucial determinates of the distribution and structure

of power in the community. Both of these institutions are directly relevant

to many of the bases of power. As we have noted, many writers have examined

economic autonomy by utilizing such indicators as absentee-ownership. It

has been offered that decreased economic autonomy results in a broader distri­

bution of community power for various reasons. When the executives of

absentee-owned corporations withdraw from local affairs, they also withdraw

important resources from the available supply of power bases; a "leveling

effect" tends to result. However, when they are active in local issues, they

also tend to widen the distribution of power by intruding new tactics, life
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styles, values, resources (e.g., taxes) etc., into the local system -- not to

mention simply increasing the number of competing actors who potentially have

the resources to be influential. Furthermore, when the locus for such impor­

tant economic decisions having community-wide implications as personnel lay­

offs or the relocation of plants lies outside the community, the viability of

the local decision-making structure is weakened*

The degree of political and governmental autonomy is also relevant to

the distribution of power. If a large percentage of local government revenue

and services comes from outside sources, the autonomy and resource base of the

local government institution may be weakened* For instance, the decision to

allocate certain funds to the local community from state sources obviously

entails a decision whose locus is outside the community, and whose resolution

is only indirectly influenced by the local citizens•

Economic and political autonomy may vary independently of each other*

From the literature we have noted that where both institutions are autonomous,

there is a tendency for an elitist structure of power to be existent in the

community. Where they are both dependent, the tendency is toward pluralism.

With political-dependence and economic-autonomy, one would expect a more

pluralistic system, but with strong economic influence. Political autonomy

and economic dependence would be still more pluralistic, but with strong

governmental and political influence.

D. Governmental Structure

The structure of local government in the United States basically varies

along three dimensions: the locus of executive authority, the method of

electing representatives, and the type of ballot used. At one extreme is what

may be called a traditional, political structure* In this form executive
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authority resides in the office of a mayor; representatives are elected by

ward or district; and a partisan ballot is utilized. The other basic form

of government is often labeled a "reform" or "good government" structure. In

this case, executive authority resides in the position of the city manager;

representation is on an at-large basis; and a non-partisan ballot is used.

These three dimensions, however, need not -- and do not -- vary together. They

are independent dimensions and can appear in any combination. Also, a combin­

ation of at-large and district representation is often included with the other

two variables. There is a tendency, though, for them to appear in the above

configurations.

The governmental structure of the local community would appear to

affect the distribution and structure of social power in the total community

system. Obviously government has the legal basis of power in the local system.

The structure of this legal, authoritatively-based power would appear to be

relevant to the configuration of other elements of social power in the com­

munity. For example, it is generally assumed that administrative authority

reaches its highest degree of centralization and articulation in the city

manager, as opposed to the mayor, form of government. If this is the case,

in cities with city manager governments, with less direct political control

and involvement with the executive office, one might expect greater governmental

influence in the leadership pool. Also, we must remember that the "good

government" structure was proposed as a "reform" of the traditional structure.

This reform was aimed at eliminating corruption, "bossism," and political

"in-fighting" from local government, and increasing citizen participation in

the political process. If citizen participation does in fact increase, power

becomes more dispersed and the structure more pluralistic.
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The consequences, however, of these contrasting structures are not clear.

It may also be that certain elements of the traditional structure -- particularly

ward or district representation -- may also increase citizen participation

and result in increased pluralism. With district representation the council­

man or alderman is directly responsible to a constituency which shares common

problems and expectations due to ecological, racial, and/or class similarities.

Where these groups have some control over their representative through the

ballot box, they may have more direct influence in the structure of power.

Of course, a crucial assumption of either position that may not be tenable is

that the local government is a viable, important element in the local power

structure.

E. Organizational Density

The concept of organizational density refers to the number of voluntary

organizations in the community relative to the size of the community's popu­

lation. Certain communities suffer from "organizational poverty." They have

few organizations relative to the number of citizens. Since voluntary organi­

zations are major "linking mechanisms" within the community, a community with

few organizations may face problems with system integration. At the other

extreme are those communities that are epitomized by "organizational satura­

tion." The number of voluntary organizations is extremely high in relation­

ship to the size of the population.

This structural variable would appear to influence the distribution and

structure of power. A voluntary organization represents (1) a potential basis

of response in any community issue, (2) a resource whose control may serve

as an important base of power, and (3) a potential power actor in its own

right. A community with a high density of organizations simply has more
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voices that could potentially be heard in any issue, and more organized groups

with relevant resources who can enter controversies than one in the situation

of "organizational poverty.11 Such a situation would logically tend to dis­

tribute power more widely within the system, and thus influence the power

structure toward the direction of pluralism*

An obvious operational indicator of this variable is a comparison of the

number of voluntary organizations to the size of the population in the commun­

ity. Such a ratio would provide at least a crude index, although such additional

indicators as total organizational membership and the percentage of the

community population that are members of local organizations could also be used.

F. Economic Base

The type of economic structure existent in the community should logically

affect the distribution, structure, and exercise of power. Many of the resources

that can be utilized as bases of power are defined, controlled, and distri­

buted by the economic structure. More specifically, two elements of the

economic structure appear to be of crucial relevance. First, the major

economic function performed in the community is a particularly powerful factor

influencing other structural elements and system characteristics. A number of

studies have examined such differences between manufacturing, retail trade,

agricultural, resort, financial, governmental, educational, and diversified

cities. Actors representing the dominant economic activity in the coiranunity

would obviously be included in the power structure due to the resources they

control. Also, the overall structure of leadership would appear to be related

to the dominant function. For example, the leadership pool of an industrial

city would probably include actors from management and labor; in a retail trade

city, one could expect to find businessmen; in an educational center, maybe

professors and administrators.
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Second, the diversification of the economic base would also appear

relevant. Where there is little diversification in the economic base* the

dominant economic institution has a greater proportion of the relevant

resources; a proportion that can become a monopoly. In a one-industry town,

the centralization of such resources as money and wealth and control over

jobs facilitates the formation of an elite power structure. Diversification

of the economic base, however, tends to widen the distribution of resources.

There are fewer actors with great quantities of resources, but many actors

with some power. In such a situation actors can exchange resources that are

issue relevant, form coalitions to increase their power base, or only attempt

to exercise power in those areas where their resources are most applicable.

Therefore, the greater the diversification of the economic base, the more

pluralistic the structure of power.

G« Social Class

Sociologists have utilized social class as an independent variable in

investigating such diverse phenomena as political attitudes and behavior,

the etiology of mental illness, fertility and family size, pre-marital sexual

behavior, and preference for social change. It would appear that the social

class dimension of the community would affect the distribution and structure of

local power. Two aspects of social class appear to be relevant: (1) the

amount of hierarchical differentiation and the horizontal shape of the local

stratification system, and (2) the median class level of the community.

Concerning the initial class dimension, the relationship of the shape of

the local stratification system to the distribution of power is not conceptually

clear, nor has it been empirically investigated. One might argue that in a

community characterized by class homogeneity, with little vertical spread and
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differentiation in the class structure, power would tend to be widely dis­

tributed due to the wide distribution of power relevant resources* Where there

is a great spread between the highest and lowest classes, however, and a

large degree of differentiation with little social mobility, one might expect

a more elitist structure of power due to the centralization and control of

resources by the upper classes. Other factors, however, such as social access

to the community leaders may contaminate such a relationship. Also, the

shape of the local stratification system is so highly interrelated with many

of the other structural variables that its effect may be difficult to isolate.

The overall class level of the community must also be considered. It

might be proposed that the higher the median class level of the community

(measured by such variables as median income and median education) the more

widely distributed the decision-making structure. We have already noted that

political participation increases with social class position. Furthermore,

such power resources as money and wealth, knowledge and specialized skills,

control over jobs and mass media, etc., are class relevant variables. The

inclusion of social class in the model, therefore, appears to be justified.

In summary, in the above section we have presented the structural vari­

ables that are included in our model. We have attempted to justify their

inclusion on the basis of previous work in the field, and on the basis of their

logical, theoretical relationship to the structure of power. We have not

posited hypotheses systematically associating them with characteristics of

the leadership pool. The explication of such propositions will follow the

next section in which the latter characteristics will be presented.

Before turning to that section, we must note the issue of covariance.

It is obvious from even a cursory examination of these variables that they
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are not independent. For example, factors such as social class, demographic

heterogeneity, size, rate of population growth, and autonomy are interrelated.

These interrelationships create problems for analysis that must not be mini­

mized. These variables have been selected because of their apparent associ­

ation with the distribution, structure, and exercise of power.

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

The second set of dimensions in our model are those variables which are

relevant to a description of the distribution and structure of social power.

These dimensions include: (1) size of the leadership pool, (2) institutional

dominance, (3) social class composition of the leadership pool, (4) legitimacy,

(5) visibility, (6) scope of influence, (7) cohesiveness, (8) entrenchment,

and (9) cosmopolitan-localite orientation. These variables have been selected

because they present a fairly complete picture of the distribution and struc­

ture of power. Furthermore, variation in the structure of leadership along

these dimensions would appear to affect the leadership pool's perception and

definition of community problems. The reader will note that the traditional

"elitist-pluralist11 or !lmonomorphic-polymorphicn dimensions are not included

in the model. Actually, these dimensions are included, but are broken into

four separate indicators: legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, and

cohesiveness. For example, a traditional economic elite, such as Hunter found

in Atlanta, would be characterized by low legitimacy, low visibility, a broad

scope of influence, and high cohesiveness. These dimensions may, however, vary

independently. Therefore, examining them separately is more advantageous than

lumping them together and utilizing the more gross concepts of "elitist-plura­

list" or !Imonomorphic-polymorphic.11
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Before we turn to an explication of each of these variables, and subse­

quently relate them to the previously mentioned community structural variables,

let us define more precisely what we mean by a leadership pool.

A, Definition

We shall define as the leadership pool THOSE COMPONENTS OF ANY SOCIAL

SYSTEM, BE THEY INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, OR ORGANIZATIONS, THAT ARE IDENTIFIED

AS POSSESSING SUPERQRDINATE SOCIAL POWER AND THE ABILITY TO AFFECT THE PRO­

CESSES IN THE SYSTEM.

Before we attempt to dissect this definition, perhaps a few comments

about our choice of the term "leadership pool" to describe the group of

power actors in the community is necessary. The obvious question is "why

not use fpower structure1 or 'power elite1 like everybody else?" While we

will not enter into a full discussion of our preference for "leadership pool"

as opposed to these other concepts, let us only note a few basic reasons. The

term "power structure" seems to imply a highly structured, rather static,

elitist model of the group of community power actors. As Delbert Miller

states, research and methodology in this area have been greatly impeded by

the term, elite. If any segment of our conceptual or methodological apparatus

should have a decent burial, it is this misleading term. The term implies a

high solidarity and a consensus on goals and values among a community's

power actors. This solidarity and consensus must be questions for empirical

research, not a priori assumptions. The term "pool" implies no such consensus

or "smoke-filled room" imagery.

Furthermore, the term "power structure" has become a part of everyday

language; it has also become a value-laden term, connoting all that is sinister,

corrupt, amoral, and decadent within our society. Being synonymous with "the
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establishment/3 it has become a meaningless term for scientific analysis. Its

emotional value as a rhetorical device may be great; its conceptual merit,

however , is minimal«

It must be noted9 however, that the concept9 structure, does have a value

that must not be overlooked. Structure implies the existence of some form of

patterned relationships among the power actors* It highlights the point that

a network of influence is often brought to bear upon many decisions in the

community* This Interaction among power actors often is necessitated because

each actor ha^ power resting upon various bases and resources* Some of these

resources may be more relevant for one issue as opposed to another. By inter­

acting and bargaining with other actors, by utilizing the tactics of exchange,

cooptation, and coalition, a network of power may form.

Of course, the nature of the relationships among power actors and even

the existence of such relationships also must be empirically proven, not

assumed. Again, the term "pool11 -- while not disregarding these relationships

-- does not infer these unwarranted assumptions.

Let us now turn to an explication of the dimensions of the leadership

pool. The method we will utilize is similar to that we followed in presenting

the community structural variables. In addition, we will offer a few illus­

trative propositions relating these first two components of our model.

B. Size of the Leadership Pool

The number of actors in the leadership pool is an obvious, but important,

dimension. Size may be a good indicator of the centralization of decision

making. Where the leadership pool is small (relative to the size of the

community population) we might assume that a more centralized leadership

structure exists in which superordinate power is held by a few individuals.
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Of course, where the number of power actors is large, power is more decen­

tralized. Furthermore9 the scope of power in the latter situation would appear

to be rather narrowo Cdhesiveness among the power actors would tend to be

rather weak as the possible networks of exchange and coalition formation

increase geometrically with an arithmetic increase in the number of actorgo

With a large number of power actors9 conflicts over goals, valuess tactics,

priorities, etc«, may be numerous,, The vested interests of each actor have a

catalytic effect upon the structure and exercise of power.

Any community structural variable that increases or decreases the quan­

tity of the power-relevant resources in the system; distributes these resources

throughout the system; and/or generally affects citizen participation in the

decision-making structure would appear to be a determinant of the size of

the leadership pool. Therefore, a number of propositions may be offered.

These propositions are illustrative. Some have empirical support; others are

logically deducted from the model*, They should be viewed as irreversible,

stochastic, coextensive, sufficient, and substitutable propositions. This

list, and all of the other illustrative lists, is not inclusive. A matrix

of proposed relationships will be presented at the end of this section.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the larger the size of

the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the larger

the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the larger

the size of the leadership pool.
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The greater the economic and government dependence (the less the

autonomy) of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversification in the community, the larger

the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the larger

the size of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the larger the size

of the leadership pool.

We have included the size of the leadership pool in our model also

because this variable would appear to be related to the perception and

definition of local community problems. The larger the number of power

actors, the larger the number of perceived problems, the greater the diffi­

culty in reaching consensus concerning priority, and the more difficult the

coordination of ameliorative action.

C, Institutional Dominance

This variable refers to the extent to which a single institution dominates

the leadership pool in the community. There are two elements to this dimen­

sion. First, the extent of perceived power residing in the institution, as an

institution, e.g., the "power11 of the educational, religious, economic, politi­

cal, etc., institutions. Second, the extent to which actors from the insti­

tution are represented in the leadership pool. At one logical end of the

continuum are those communities in which perceived power and representation

reside in a single institution. At the other extreme are those communities

in which power is equally distributed across the institutional areas. More

likely, however, are those cases where power is decentralized and shared by

a few institutions. Due to their inordinate share of power-relevant resources,
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the political and economic institutions are often found in some sort of uneasy,

symbiotic relationship. For the researcher, therefore, the crucial question

is "Is there institutional dominance?11 If the answer is yes, then "By whom?"

We again find that those structural variables which affect the quantity

and distribution of the bases of social power also will influence the extent

and nature of institutional dominance in the leadership pool. Where the struc­

ture of the community is such that these resources are widely distributed

across the institutions, there is less likelihood of any single institution

dominating the leadership pool. Where the resources are centralized in one

institution, however, the probability is that the favored institution may

dominate the system.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less likely is the

dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less

likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and governmental dependence (i.e., the less

the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less likely is the

dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The greater the economic dependence and governmental autonomy of the

community, the more likely is the political institution to be dominant.

The greater the economic autonomy and governmental dependence of the

community, the more likely is the economic institution to be dominant.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less likely

is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.
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The higher the social class level of the community, the less likely is

the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

These propositions require a few comments. It should be noted that

empirical support for these propositions generally is lacking. It may be

that the relationships are not linear. For example, we have noted that with

increasing population size and/or rapid population growth, the governmental

institution may become more important. Also, in very small, non-autonomous

communities, the government may be powerful because it has no competitors!

Therefore, the relationship may be curvilinear, with government being dominant

at the extreme ends of the population continuum. These propositions, however,

are presented heuristically; they are deductively drawn. In analysis, however,

the possibility of non-linear associations must not be forgotten. Finally,

there is no logical empirical or theoretical justification for positing the

existence or nature of an association between such independent structural

variables as reform government and our dependent variable of institutional

dominance. With the reform government variable, for example, one might argue

that the more reformist the character of the governmental institution, the

less likely is the dominance by a single institution -- because of increased

citizen participation associated with the reformist form of government. How­

ever, it may also be that the governmental institution itself becomes dominant

for exactly the same reason! While there is not a prior justification for

proposing the direction of these associations, they will be included in the

natrix presentation of propositions that follows this section and can be

empirically investigated.

It is obvious that the variable of institutional dominance may affect

the definition and perception of community problems* If power, for example,
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does reside in the economic institution, one may find that the perceived

problems of the leadership pool are economic in nature, or at least may

affect the economic institution of the community. Other problems may be

viewed and attacked by the strategy of "benign neglect". If power resides

in two different institutions, however, such as the economic and the religious,

one may find that the defined problems center around these institutions but

that there is little agreement as to the priority of the problems on the part

of the power actors. It is believed, therefore, that institutional dominance

will affect the number of problems defined and perceived as existent in the

community, the priority of the perceived and defined problems, the agreement

among the power actors as to the priority of community problems, etc,

D. Social Class Composition of the Leadership Pool

Probably no other dimension of the distribution of power in the com­

munity has received more attention than the class level of the leaders. It

is basically because of this emphasis that we have included this variable in

our model. The literature exhibits remarkable agreement concerning the class

level of the leadership pool.

How do the social characteristics of the power actors compare to those

of the other community residents? Bohlen compared the personal and social

attributes of the power actors with those of a random sample in the same

community. The six personal and social characteristics that differed signi­

ficantly in comparing the two groups were occupation, mean gross family in­

come, education, political orientation, age, and home ownership. The power

actors were found to have significantly higher status occupations, higher

incomes, more formal education, a different political orientation, higher age,

and greater home ownership than the random sample. The two groups were found
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not to differ in the number of people living in the household and the length

Q

of residence in the community.

We could continue to review studies, but the findings are all similar.

The power actors are a privileged lot. The "typical power actor" is probably

fairly old (at least over 40), college educated, financially well-off, and a

business and professional man who has lived a fairly long time in the community.

This finding is practically tautological! High social status is based upon

those resources that are also power-re levant. We can expect the leadership

pool, therefore, to be composed of power actors with relatively high, homo­

genous class levels; levels that are probably higher than the class level of

the community due to the selectivity of "resource rich" actors into the leader­

ship pool.

The question becomes one of simply "how high?"

This association of our community structural variables to the dependent

variable of social class composition of the leadership pool is the most

confused, !1messy" relationship in the first section of the model. Any struc­

tural variable that (1) increases the median class level of the community and

(2) increases the participation of high status actors in the leadership pool

would increase the class level of the leadership pool. Any variable, however,

which functions to widen the distribution of power relevant resources, or to

strengthen a power resource which is not class defined (such as subsystem

solidarity) might act to lower the class level of the leadership pool. For

sane of the variables — size, rate of population growth, autonomy, and

economic diversity -- we cannot predict the direction of the relationship

prior to the empirical study. Perhaps our best clue is that more pluralistic
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systems in which power is widely distributed would tend to be lower in class

level than more centralized, elitist systems.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more reformist the character of local government, the lower the

social class level of the leadership pool. (Due to an increase in general

citizen participation in local affairs; the professionalization of the

governmental institution, etc.)

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the lower

the social class level of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density, the higher the social class

level of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the higher the

social class level of the leadership.

We will discuss the relationship of the social class composition of the

leadership pool to the perception and definition of community problems in

the next section. Let us note that we will utilize education and occupation

as our indicator of the social class composition of the leadership pool.

E.	 Legitimacy

The next four variables in this dimension-set were first presented by

Q

Thomas J. Anton. These four variables -- legitimacy, visibility, scope of

influence, and cohesiveness -- are extremely important in describing the

structure of power in the community. Furthermore, these variables are the

major components of the "elitist-pluralist11 dimensions.

Legitimacy is the first of these variables. One of the major points

of contention between the elitists and pluralists (and between sociologists

and political scientists) is the relative importance of the authority component

-28­

versus the influence component of power in local affairs• The concept of

legitimacy taps this dimension. Where leaders hold public or associate

office, the leadership pool is an authoritative one. Where the majority of

power actors do not hold official office, the pool can be viewed as non-

authoritative. The former pool would be classified as "legitimate"; the latter

as "non-legitimate". This dimension should be viewed as a continuum, with

some leadership pools being more "legitimate" than others.

The extent to which a leadership pool is "legitimate" has many ramifi­

cations for both the distribution and exercise of power in the community. For

example, when legitimacy is high, the citizenry of the community has a more

direct channel of pressure and influence (e.g«5 the ballot box) on the power

actors. Increased legitimacy would tend to facilitate increased pluralism.

Taken to its logical extreme, one finds a Jeffersonian democracy in which power

is widely distributed, but is legitimately embedded in the office. In a

community with a "non-legitimate" leadership pool, however, in which economic

actors dominate, the power actors are more isolated from citizen pressure and

sanction. They are more free to exercise power without concern for a consti­

tuency. In such a situation, their "vested interests" may be pursued with

reckless abandon -- only thwarted by the effects of the other power actors.

The vast bulk of the citizenry has little opportunity to directly influence

these power actors. As we shall see, they may not even know who they are.

We propose that the degree of legitimacy in the leadership pool is

strongly influenced by the structure of the community. Those structural

variables that function to increase the concentration of power-relevant

resources in the governmental institution relative to the other institutions

would appear to foster increased legitimacy. Furthermore, in communities
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where there is a great need for governmental services, such as those which

exhibit great or rapidly increasing structural differentiation, the degree

of legitimacy may increase. With these assumptions of structural differen­

tiation, high governmental influence relative to other areas, and the implicit

notion of citizen participation, we present the following propositions.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more legitimate

the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more

legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more

legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and governmental dependence (i.e., the less

the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more legitimate

the leadership pool.

The greater the economic dependence and governmental autonomy of the

community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic autonomy and governmental dependence of the

community, the less legitimate the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community,

the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more legi­

timate the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more legitimate

the leadership pool.
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The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more legitimate

the leadership pool.

With one of the core concerns of this model being the relationship between

the structure of the leadership pool and the leadership pool's perception and

definition of community problems, the degree of legitimacy appears to be a

crucial independent variable also. Where the leadership pool is legitimate,

we might expect (1) a large number of different problems to be defined (due

to the channels which various citizens have to reach those with legitimate

power); (2) problems to represent either governmental or "the total community's"

concerns; (3) the government to be viewed as responsible for a large proportion

of the problems; (4) a higher level of agreement concerning the urgency and

priority of these problems, etc. By comparison, a community with a relatively

non-legitimate leadership pool might have fewer perceived and defined problems.

Furthermore, these problems might represent "issue specific11 (i«e*, business,

industry, education, etc.) concerns over which there is little agreement.

F. Visibility

Anton's second variable is visibility. The concept refers to the

extent to which the power actors are covert, "behind-the-scenes11 manipu­

lators. (It must be remembered that a central issue in the "elitist­

pluralist" debate was the degree to which the power actors were covert. This

variable makes the question an empirical, not a rhetorical, one*) This dimen­

sion may vary independently from legitimacy. Leaders who do not hold positions

of authority may or may not be covert. Thus legitimacy tells us nothing about

"visibility", unless all leaders are public or organizational officers.

Therefore, it would be possible to classify a leadership pool as "legitimate­

invisible", etc. This dimension must also be viewed as falling on a continuum.
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The extent to which a leadership pool is visible is associated with

the distribution and exercise of power. Where the pool is "invisible", few

constraints are placed upon the hidden power actors. These actors are rela­

tively free to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, there are fewer

avenues for redress open to the general citizenry than where the pool is

"visible". Obviously, this variable is related to the degree of citizen

participation in the leadership pool and to the general distribution of

power. If the pool is "invisible", power is probably confined to a small

number of actors, working covertly; i.e., an elite. Therefore, factors which

would tend to hinder the development of an elite in a community would also

tend to increase the visibility of the leadership pool.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the

autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less visible the leader­

ship pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less

visible the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community,

the more visible the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more

visible the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more visible

the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more visible

the leadership pool.
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We will be examining the relationship between the degree of visibility

of the leadership pool and the pool's perception and definition of com&Tunity

problems. The degree of visibility would appear to affect the number of

perceived problems, the degree of agreement among the power actors concerning

the urgency of these problems, and the extent to which problems related to

only one institutional area dominate the perception of the leadership pool.

These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

G. Scope of Influence

This dimension taps what is possibly the key issue in the debate between

the "elitists" and the "pluralists". This dimension recognizes that one leader

or a set of leaders may participate in decision making in a wide range of

community issues, or different leaders or sets of leaders may be active in

different areas. In one community the leadership pool may have "general

overall influence" in various areas, such as the economic, political, edu­

cational, religious, and cultural institutions. In this case the scope of

influence would be very broad, and a single pyramid might adequately describe

the distribution of power. In another community, however, a division of labor

may occur in which certain actors are influential in specific areas only.

In this case, the pool has a narrow scope of influence. This latter situation

exists due to differing bases of social power and access to power resources by

the power actors, and is present where resources are decentralized and

broadly distributed throughout the community.

The scope of influence of the leadership pool has obvious implications

for the exercise of social power. Where the scope of influence is narrow,

and the leadership pool is fractured with a number of "institutional-specific11

influence pyramids, any problem or issue that cuts across institutional areas
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will have to be attacked by means of exchange and the formation of coalitions

among the power actors. Coordinated action and efficient output from such

a leadership pool may become problematic. Of course, such a situation also

is a strong indicator of a decentralized, pluralistic decision-making structure,

and may therefore be viewed as being more responsive to overall community

problems, not as motivated by strong vested interests, and more ''controllable11

by the general citizenry than a pool with broad scope.

Two generalizations emerge. First, it is highly unlikely that a leadership

pool will be composed completely of general influence leaders. For such a

situation to exist, every power actor would have to possess influence in every

institutional area; with the distribution of power relevant resources in the

community, this is not likely. No leadership pool exhibits the broadest

possible scope of influence. Second, however, there are both specialized and

general power actors in any leadership pool. Therefore, the question becomes

one of degree; how broad is the scope of influence of one leadership pool in

comparison to that of others.

From the literature and the model, it appears that those community structural

variables which affect such variables as (1) the degree of structural differen­

tiation in the system, (2) the distribution of power relevant resources, (3)

the nature and quantity of power relevant resources available in the system,

(4) the number of power actors in the system, etc., will influence the scope

of power actors in the system, etc., will influence the scope of influence in

the leadership pool. Any factors which increase the structural differentiation

in the system, broaden the distribution of power-relevant resources, increase

the quantity of issue-specific resources, increase the number of power actors,

etc., would appear to narrow the scope of influence.
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Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more narrow the

scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more

narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more

narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the

autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more narrow the scope

of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more narrow

the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more narrow

the scope of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more narrow

the scope of the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the com­

munity, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

Ho Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness is the fourth dimension mentioned by Anton. The concept

refers to the degree and nature of interaction among the power actors in

the leadership pool. The actors may exhibit a high level of interaction,

or they may be relatively isolated from each other. They may form one group,

or be divided into cliques or fractions. The more cohesive the leadership

pool, the smaller the number of clique and fractional patterns, and the

higher the level of interaction among the power actors.
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One would expect at least some interaction among the power actors. The

exercise of power in general, and the process of handling issues and problems

that cut across institutional areas in particular, necessitate it. If the

power actors are to pool their resources, exchange vital resources, form

coalitions to affect key decisions, etc., they must interact. What is

crucial for the exercise of power, however, is the extent of cohesiveness

within the leadership pool. Where there is high cohesion, coordinated activity

is facilitated, the degree of consensus concerning emergning community issues

and problems among the power actors is likely to be heightened, and the general

output of the decision-making structure may be increased. On the other hand,

where there is low cohesion, coordinated activity is problematic, consensus

among the power actors may be low as each is involved in its own domain, and

the level of outputs is likely to be relatively low.

Certain community structural variables would appear to affect the degree

of cohesion within the leadership pool. Cohesion would tend to be lessened

if the structure of the community isolates the power actors from one another,

hinders their interaction, increases their number, and generally fragments the

structure of the leadership pool. Structural variables that facilitate differ­

entiation and cleavage within the local system would appear to be particularly

relevant.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less cohesive the

leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less

cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less

cohesive the leadership pool.
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The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the

autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less cohesive the leader­

ship pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the local

community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less

cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the less cohesive

the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less cohesive

the leadership pool.

I. Entrenchment

The concept of entrenchment refers to the relative period of time that

the power actors in the leadership pool have spent in the local community.

The average number of years spent in the community is only a part of this

concept. What is more crucial is the average proportion of the power actor's

life that has been spent in the community. Such a proportion includes both the

time spent within and outside the local area. For example, in one community

the average power actor may have spent only 20 percent of his lifetime in the

local community. On the other hand, in another community the power actors may

have spent on the average 90 percent of their life in the local place. This

latter leadership pool is more "entrenched" in the local system than the former

one.

The degree of entrenchment in the leadership pool has implications for

the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in the system. In a

community in which the leadership is highly entrenched and the power actors

have spent a great deal of their life in the local town, the structure of
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decision making would tend to be stable. New actors with different values,

goals, life styles, and resources would not be available to "shake up" the

leadership pool. Certain of the bases of social power, particularly status,

prestige, popularity, and social access to community leaders, might become

more valuable and useful. There would probably be a higher level of cohesive­

ness and consensus on the part of the power actors, and the leadership pool's

knowledge of, concern for, and personal identification with the community

might be greater than in a low entrenched, highly mobile pool.

The literature provides no clues as to the nature of the association

between the structural variables in the community and the degree of entrench­

ment in the leadership pool. The concept has not been presented previously in the

power literature. It would appear, however, that any structural variable that

would affect the level of in-migration, alter the local normative order, and

generally influence the ability of new residents to enter the leadership pool

would affect the degree of entrenchment. For example, where such variables as the

rate of growth, local dependence, absentee-ownership, and dispersion of power-

relevant resources are high, the leadership pool may be less entrenched, and the

power actors more mobile*

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less entrenched the

leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less

entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less

entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the

autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less entrenched the

leadership pool.
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The more reformist the character of the local government in the community,

the less entrenched the leadership pool-

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less entrenched

the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the less entrenched

the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less entrenched

the leadership pool*

The dimension of entrenchment has also been included in the model because

of its apparent relationship to the leadership pool's perception and definition

of community problems. In communities with entrenched leadership pools one

might expect greater consensus on both the perception and definition of prob­

lems, greater agreement concerning the urgency of the problems, a greater

tendency to view the problems as unique, local concerns rather than manifes­

tations of larger societal issues, a greater proclivity for defining the local

community as the responsible agent for amelioration without outside help, etc.

These associations will be explicated in the next section.

J. Cosmopolitanism-Localism

This final characteristic of the leadership pool has been selected

mainly in order to investigate its effect upon community problem perception

and definition. The distinction between cosmopolitanism and localism has

often been utilized in social research. Merton has described a person who

has a "localite11 orientation as "parochial11. His interests are confined to

the local community. He is preoccupied with local problems to the virtual

exclusion of the national and international scene. A "cosmopolitan", on

the other hand, may live in the local community, but he identifies and relates
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himself to issues, events, and social organization in the broader national

and international milieu.

The most extensive examination of this concept in relation to the distri­

bution of power, however, was undertaken by Merton. Merton used a form of

the reputational technique to locate the leaders in Rovere. He then classified

the leaders by their local and cosmopolitan orientation. The orientation did

not refer to the arena in which the influentials were effective, but rather

how each viewed the problems of the local community. Locals wished to estab­

lish frequent contacts with a great many people as a means to further their

career while cosmopolitans desired quality. The locals belonged to voluntary

organizations in order to make contacts and the cosmopolitans to organizations

requiring special skills or knowledge* The locals held political posts while

the cosmopolitans were more often on professional boards. The path to success

for the localite was an elaborate network of personal relationships while the

cosmopolitan was equipped with skills that furthered his upward mobility. Cos­

mopolitans were outsiders. The cosmopolitan was followed because he knew; the

localite because he understood.

Fran the above studies we can infer that the degree of cosmopolitanism or

localism in the leadership pool will be influenced by those structural variables

which affect the autonomy, social class level, structural differentiation, and

degree of political dominance in the community. Those communities that are

economically and politically dependent upon the larger society, enjoy a rela­

tively high social class level, have diversity within their demographic and

economic bases, and have a reformist type of government with emphasis upon

professionalism in the performance of political roles, are most likely to

have cosmopolitan leadership pools. It must be noted, however, that the
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leadership pool of any community will not be completely cosmopolitan. The

power actors obviously are concerned with the condition within the local

system. This system is the locus of power for these actors.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more cosmopolitan

the leadership pool*

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more

cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more

cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the

autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more cosmopolitan the

leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community,

the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less

cosmopolitan the leadership pool*

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more cosmo­

politan the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more cosmopolitan

the leadership pool.

As we noted, this variable has been specifically included in the model

in order to examine its association with the leadership pool's perception

and definition of problems. Such factors as the number of problems, their degree

of uniqueness, the extent to which they are defined as solvable at the local

level, and the degree of consensus regarding their urgency and importance
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may be influenced by the orientation of the leadership pool along the cosmo­

politan-localite continuum.

In this section we have presented our definition of the leadership

pool and presented nine dimensions for classifying leadership pools.

These pools can be classified by size, institutional dominance, social

class level, legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, cohesiveness,

entrenchment, and cosmopolitan-local orientation. It is offered that classi­

fication along such variables is a needed refinement to the usual "elitist­

pluralist" or "monolithic-polylithic" distinctions. Thus, we might have a

small, economic, high social class, non-legitimate, invisible, general influ­

ence, cohesive, highly entrenched, localite pool in one community, as opposed

to a large, economic-political, middle class, legitimate, visible, issue-

specific, factional, non-entrenched, cosmopolitan leadership pool in another.

We also offered illustrative propositions relating the structure of the

community to these characteristics of the leadership pool. Figure 2 presents

in matrix form these propositions. The tentative nature of these propositions

must be emphasized. They have been deductively drawn from the literature and

the model. They await empirical validation.

Let us now turn to the third main dimension-set in our model -- community

problem dimensions. In the next section we will present this dimension and

relate its variables to the characteristics of the leadership pool. The

final component of the model, i.e., patterns of community action, will be

similarly treated in a subsequent section.
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2Figure 2 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNITY STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
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The Model:

Community Problem Dimensions and

Patterns of Community Action

In this section we will consider the final two dimension sets in the

model: i.e., community problem dimensions and patterns of community action.

As the reader may note, the first two sets of variables basically were struc­

tural in nature. They were concerned with the patterns of association between

selected elements of the community and certain analytical dimensions of the

community's pool of leadership. The dimensions in this chapter are more per­

ceptual and social-psychological. We will be concerned with the power actors

perception of problems, the analytical nature of their definition of problems,

and the patterns inherent in the proposals they offer to ameliorate these

problems.

Let us turn to the third dimension of our model.

Community Problem Dimensions

We are now about to enter virgin territory* In this section we will

present a definition of community problems, offer seven analytical dimensions

for classifying these problems based upon their perception and definition by

the leadership pool, and relate these dimensions to the characteristics of

the leadership pool. One of the working hypotheses of this model is that the

structure and characteristics of the leadership pool will affect the pool's

perception and definition of local problems* Such dimensions as the number

of perceived problems, the degree of consensus shown by the power actors in

defining the seriousness of the problems, the clarity of the definitions, and
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the extent to which the perceived problems are institutionally specific will

be affected by the scope, cohesiveness, class level, legitimacy, visibility,

etc., of the leadership pool. Furthermore, it is proposed that the manner in

which problems are perceived and defined will affect the types of action that

are proposed for ameliorating them.

It was decided that the major criterion for the inclusion of a dimension

was that it exhibit an apparent relationship with types of action that might

be proposed to ameliorate the perceived problem. In other words, the attempt

was made to include dimensions whose configurations would affect the nature of

the action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the problem* Concern was

evidenced in selecting dimensions that might affect such variables as the

degree of urgency of the proposed action, the degree of coordination within

the community required for implementing the proposal, and the degree of

external aid needed in carrying out the proposed action. In addition, however,

dimensions were sought which might be influenced by the characteristics of

the leadership pool. To be included in the model, therefore, a dimension had

to be able to serve a dual function. It had to be logically possible to view

it as both a dependent (to the characteristics of the leadership pool) and an

independent (to the proposed ameliorative action) variable.

These are stringent criteria. Certain dimensions were considered and

not included because of a lack of fit with the other elements in the model.

The attempt was made to select dimensions that could be applied to any

perceived problem, and were not dependent upon the nature of any specific

problem. For example, dimensions were chosen that could be applied to com­

munity problems as varied as juvenile delinquency, zoning, school finances,

industrial development, sex education, local government taxation, slum
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clearance, apathy, and water pollution. The task of selecting and justifying

these dimensions would have been much easier if previous studies had analyzed

the problem. As it is, the task is similar to attempting to construct a full

score for an improvisational work by Bruin. One has an idea what types of

elements to select to produce a coherent, logical, whole -- but there are no

guidelines, classical conventions, or precedents to guide the endeavor.

Mistakes may have been made. Therefore, this formulation must be viewed as

tentative. It is hoped that even the heuristic application that this study

represents will aid in refining the model.

The dimensions selected are (1) the number of perceived problems, (2)

the perceived seriousness of the problems, (3) the degree of consensus concerning

the seriousness of the problems in the community, (4) the extent of insti­

tutional specificity versus community generality inherent in the perceived

problems, (5) the extent to which the perceived problems are viewed as

solvable by the local community, (6) the degree of uniqueness of the problems,

and (7) the degree of clarity in the definitions of the problems. These

concepts will be defined and their place in the model explicated shortly. First,

however, let us examine what we mean by community problems,

A. Definition

We shall define as community problems those CURRENT OR FUTURE CONDITIONS

PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT OR LIKELY TO OCCUR WITHIN THE COMMUNITY SOCIAL SYSTEM

THAT ARE DEFINED BY POWER ACTORS IN THE IEADERSHIP POOL AS BEING DYSFUNCTIONAL

AND REQUIRING AMELIORATION, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITION CAN BE AMELIORATED.

We begin our definition by stating that community problems are CURRENT

OR FUTURE CONDITIONS PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT OR LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE COM­

MUNITY SOCIAL SYSTEM. The key word is perceived. The conditions we are
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labeling as community problems are those that are perceived by the power

actors as being currently present in the cctmunity or as having a high prob­

ability of future occurrence. Whether or not the condition is present objec­

tively is of little importance. What is crucial is that the power actors

perceived that it is, or soon may be. It is possible that the power actors

may be chasing shadows and "looking for men under the bed.11 What they

consider as being problems within the community may only exist in their per­

ceptual set, influenced by what they view as their vested interests. (The

fear expressed by a banker in a small midwestern town over a radical leftist

takeover of the community by poisoning the citizens with fluoride in the

water system may be such a "problem11.) On the other hand, what the actors

perceive as problems may be crucial needs, inconsistencies, contradictions,

or deficiencies objectively present within the local community. Of course

what is "objectively present" is always contingent upon one's criteria for

selection, frame of reference, and location in the system; it may be impossible

to determine the objective presence of all community problems with any degree

of validity. There may be as many different problems as there are residents

in the community! As we shall note below, what is important is that it is

these perceived problems that will probably be attacked by the leadership pool.

These are the conditions that will affect the nature of the poolTs activity

and the future of the system.

Perception, however, is not our only concern. We offer that these

perceived conditions are those THAT ARE DEFINED BY POWER ACTORS IN THE

LEADERSHIP POOL AS BEING DYSFUNCTIONAL AND REQUIRING AMELIORATION. To be

considered a problem, therefore, a condition must meet two criteria. It

must be defined by the power actors as being detrimental, pernicious, baneful,

or deleterious to the community. In addition, however, it must be a condition

that the actors define as requiring some measure of activity to solve. It
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is possible that a condition may be viewed as dysfunctional but the power

actors do not see it as requiring amelioration* Perhaps the issue is "not

that bad11. Perchance it is something "we have lived with so long that we're

used to it11. Possibly it is a situation that "those people brought on them­

selves — they love to live that way, letfs not bother them". By our defi­

nition, these conditions are not problems. They are not defined as requiring

amelioration. Of course, it is possible for a problem to be defined as

needing a solution, but subsequently no action may be taken by the power

actors* This inactivity may be caused by numerous factors. It, however, is

also important, The decision not to attempt to solve the problem, or not to

initiate an ameliorative program after the condition has been defined as

dysfunctional and requiring a solution, represents action to undertake

inaction* The subsequently proposed activity, as we shall note shortly, is

influenced by the nature of the problem definition. Conditions which meet

these criteria, therefore, qualify as problems in our model.

Finally, we state WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITION CAN BE AMELIORATED, It

is possible that certain conditions may not be solvable, at least at the

local level. Problems such as inflation and voting rights extension may be

true concerns perceived as existing in the local community by the power actors.

Solutions to such problems, however, do not lie at the local level. What this

phrase highlights is that it may not be presently possible to solve all of

the conditions that we might label as corariunity problems. What is important,

however* is that the power actors perceive the conditions as dysfunctional,

and define these problems in such a manner that ameliorative action is viewed

as being required.
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Let us now turn to the community problem dimensions. Our modus operandi

will be similar to that used in presenting the characteristics of the leader­

ship pool, except that we will be unable to cite the previous work in the

area.

B. The Number of Perceived Problems

The most obvious dimension for classifying the problems of the leadership

pool is simply the number of different problems that power actors perceive

as existing in the community. This dimension is important in that it indi­

cates the actors' perception of "the state of the community,1' and may also

serve as a measure of the perceived stress and strain in the local system.

Obviously, one must be careful in using such a crude indicator in this manner.

The actors (1) may not perceive many problems that are present (e.g., poverty

in the hidden ghetto or pollution in the local stream), (2) may not acknowledge

the existence of problems that are perceived by the general citizenry (e.g., a

lack of effective community leadership), and/or (3) may perceive problems that

are not actually existent in the community (eog., a "Communist conspiracy11).

What this dimension does tell us, however, is basically the number of different

conditions present in the local community that the leadership pool views as

being problematic. Where the number is large, one finds a leadership pool

that is faced with such tasks as assigning priorities, allocating resources,

coordinating action, and planning strategies to handle the volume of concerns;

in this situation these tasks become problems in themselves. It may not be a

question of "guns and butter", but the choice between "sewers and welfare11

or "schools and low taxes" is just as difficult.

The number of perceived problems would appear to be affected by the

characteristics of the leadership pool. Those characteristics of the leader­

ship pool which affect such factors as the number of actors, the number of
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contacts and channels that those in the leadership pool have with others in

the system, the rate and nature of the information exchange with the pool*

the scope of the leadership pool, etc., would also appear to influence the

number of perceived problems. Any leadership pool that is large> visible,

narrow in scope, factional, and generally associated with a wide, issue-

specific distribution of power would tend to perceive a large number of

different problems. Each power actor, relatively isolated from the other

actors in the pool both with respect to the area of influence and the rate

of interaction, would tend to perceive problems relevant to his institutional

sphere. The larger the number of actors and the more widely distributed the

decision-making structure, the larger the number of problems.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the larger the number of

perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool3

the smaller the number of perceived problems»

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the larger

the number of perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the higher the number of per­

ceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the higher the number of perceived

problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the smaller the number

of perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the smaller the number of per­

ceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the larger the number of

perceived problems.
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We also consider this dimension as an independent variable which will

affect the patterns of community action proposed by the leadership pool.

We have already noted the attendant problems presented to the leadership pool

by a large number of perceived problems. These concerns should be manifested

in the proposals and tactics offered to ameliorate the problems. Such vari­

ables as the urgency, degree of coordination, amount of external aid, perceived

relevance of institutions and organizations, etc., required for the successful

implementation of the proposals would appear to be influenced by the number

of perceived problems. We will further explicate these relationships in the

final section of this chapter,

C. The Perceived Seriousness of the Problems

While the number of perceived problems is a useful dimension, this second

dimension may be even more determinant of the patterns of ameliorative activity.

Whether the perceived number of problems is large or small, the degree to which

the power actors perceive and define them as serious will have ramifications for

what, how, and particularly when they attempt to solve them. These first two

dimensions are similar in many respectso Both may be utilized as indicators

of the leadership pool's view of the welfare of the community at a given

moment in time. Both create dilemmas, when their values increase, for the

leadership pool concerning the assignment of priorities, the distribution of

resources, etc. Also, both share the strengths and weaknesses that we have

previously noted in being perceived by the leadership pool.

The two dimensions, however, are independento It is possible to consider

four types of communities based on the number and seriousness of the problems.

The "deadly combination", of course, is a community in which the leadership

pool perceives a high number of problems and defines them as serious. The
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task facing such a pool by their own definition is monumental. In such a

situation conflicts over priorities, resources, strategies, etc., are likely

as there are many problems worthy of amelioration. Due to factors such as

this, one might predict a low output, or low level of successful ameliorative

action, as the leadership pool attempts to decide simply where to start! The

high number-low seriousness and low number-high seriousness communities might

prove to be interesting for future analysis. The former faces the same prob­

lems as the high number-high seriousness community — without the sense of

urgency* One might expect a leadership pool in such a condition to employ

the tactic of "benign neglect"• The latter, however, does not face the

question of priority. It has few problems, but they are serious. They are

visible. One might predict a fairly high output from such a leadership pool.

This dimension of seriousness was included in the model primarily for

its utility as an independent variable. The perceived degree of seriousness,

however, also would appear to be dependent upon the characteristics of the

leadership pool. This dimension, though, is similar to the social class

dimension in the previous section. The relationship between the characteristics

of the leadership pool and the pool's perception of the seriousness of the

community problems is not self -evident „ Furthermore, there are no previous

studies that provide clues as to the direction of such an association. In

examining the relationship, however, it would appear that a cosmopolitan

leadership pool would tend to view the problems of the community as less

serious than a localist one. The power actors in the former are simply not

that concerned with local issues. Conversely, an entrenched leadership pool

may view the problems in the community as being serious. Such a pool is

composed of power actors who have spent a large proportion of their lives in
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the community, and have probably acquired a rather high degree of identifi­

cation with the community. These high levels of familiarity and concern

might result in seriously perceived problems. Furthermore, a narrow scoped,

factional pool might also tend to perceive a high degree of severity inherent

in the local problems. In such a pool, the power actors are isolated and

hold and exercise influence in only one or a few institutional areas• Prob­

lems within these areas are salient to these actors. Issues within their

spheres of influence are likely to be important to their vested interests.

Therefore, such problems may be viewed as serious. Concommitantly, the per­

ceived degree of severity inherent in the local problem definitions may be

high.

These propositions are extremely tenuous and their explication may be

considered as heuristic«, They are offered at this time, however, in order

that they may be empirically examined.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived

problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the

less serious the perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the more serious the perceived

problems.

The more broad the scope of the leadership pool, the less serious the

perceived problems*

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived

problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the more serious the perceived

problems*
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The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived

problems.

This dimension would appear to be an antecedent determinant of the pat­

terns of ameliorative action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the

defined problems. The proposed immediacy of the action is one rather obvious

dimension. Where problems are defined as serious, there is likely to be an

associated sense of urgency about their solutions. Other characteristics of

the proposed action, however, may also be affected by this dimension. The

degree of required^ institutional coordination within the community, the per­

ceived relevance of various organizations, the possibility of one actor or a

group of actors blocking the action, and the extent of external aid needed

to solve the problem are a few examples. These relationships will be more

fully discussed in the next section.

D. The Degree of Consensus Concerning the

Perceived Problems in the Community

A crucial variable is the degree of consensus shown by the power actors

concerning the existence and seriousness of the community problems. In some

communities the power actors may exhibit a high degree of consensus about what

constitutes the problems in the community. In other communities9 however,

conflict and disagreement may be found* In the latter situation effective

ameliorative action is problematic. There is little agreement among the

actors as to the nature of seriousness of the community's problems. Coordinated

action within the leadership pool is difficult to achieve as the actors are

faced with the tasks of assigning priorities, allocating resources, and planning

strategies to solve the problems* Where the leadership pool evidences consensus

regarding the problematic condition of the community, however, efforts at

-55­

successful solution and change are enhanced* Consensus basically serves to

short-cut the process from perception to implementation. Where there is con­

sensus within the leadership pool concerning the seriousness of the community's

problems, the pool can more easily institute the types of action they perceive

as necessary to ameliorate the situation. Some of the most violent, rancorous

conflicts local communities experience are centered about this dimension of

consensus. Schools or low taxes, which shall it be? Questions such as this

must be answered before the leadership can have either choice.

The degree of consensus would appear to be influenced strongly by the

characteristics of the leadership pool. If the leadership pool is large,

factional, visible, not dominated by a single institution, and cosmopolitan

in orientation, the degree of consensus will probably be low. In such a pool

the power actors are isolated individually or in groups• There is little

interaction between them; little opportunity to converse and reach consensus.

Where they are visible, the pool receives many varied inputs about community

problems. Selecting those which are valid, urgent concerns and having the

power actors agree with such a selection may be difficult. A cosmopolitan

leadership pool may not reach consensus because of the relatively lower degree

of identification with and interest in the local community. Finally, a pool

with a narrow scope of influence would probably have a low degree of consensus.

The power actors have influence within limited institutional areas. They will

tend to perceive problems as serious within their areas. In such a situation,

based upon the vested interests of each actor in a particular segment of the

community, consensus regarding the seriousness of the overall problems in the

community will be low.
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Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the lower the level of con­

sensus concerning the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the

higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus

concerning the perceived problems•

The more visible the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus

concerning the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the higher the level of

consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus

concerning the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus

concerning the perceived problemso

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus

concerning the perceived problems.

We have already noted the effect upon coordinated action that this dimen­

sion may exhibit. Other characteristics of the ameliorative proposals may

also be affected. The perceived urgency of instituting action aimed at changing

the situation, the perceived possibility of various interest groups blocking

the action, and the perceived relevance of various organizations for a successful

implementation of the program are other dependent characteristics. Basically,

a lack of consensus about the problems in the community may produce a lack of

agreement about what is to be done to correct these conditions. Such a situ­

ation may lead to a high degree of ambiguity and inaction* Other questions
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may also be influenced by the level of consensus. Should action be the

responsibility of the government or private interests? Should external

aid be sought by the local community to solve the problems? Who should

initiate the action? We will explicate these relationships in greater detail

in the next section.

E. Institutional Specificity versus

Community Generality

This community problem dimension may be the most important in our model.

Some power actors may be myopic when perceiving community problems. These

actors tend only to perceive and define problems that are related to their own

institutional spheres. In such leadership pools, one finds governmental

officials citing only governmentally related problems; public school adminis­

trators only perceiving educational issues; and the industrial leaders viewing

as problematical only those conditions which affect the industrial sector of

the community. The leadership pool in such a community may be labeled as

"institutionally specific11 in its perception of local problems. Other power

actors may have a panoramic view of the community,. The conditions they perceive

as being problematic may be in institutional areas other than their own sphere,

and may have community wide implications. The city auditor may view school

financing as an urgent problem; the school superintendent may be concerned with

urban renewal; the industrialist may perceive that there is a great need for

increased hospital facilities in the community. If the leadership pool is

composed of actors with such a perspective, it may be labeled as exhibiting

"community generality11 in its perception. Community leadership pools can be

placed on a continuum based upon this dimension, with polar extremes being

"specificity11 and "generality11.
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The importance of this dimension lies in its relationship with the other

community problem dimensions. Such dimensions as consensus, the number of

problems3 the degree of seriousness, and the possibility of local solution may

be influenced by this dimension. For example, where the perceived problems

exhibit institutional specificity, the level of consensus will probably be

low* Each actor sees problems only related to his sphere of activity. As

the overall perception of problems becomes fragmented, the level of agreement

becomes lew. Such interrelationships between' the community problem dimensions,

however, must be empirically examined.

Whether or not the perceived problems are institutionally specific or

of general community orientation would appear to be strongly influenced by

the characteristics of the leadership pool* No set of perceived problems

would ever be completely specific or general in orientation. Some specificity

is to be expected due to the vested interests of pewer actors who do not possess

a broad scope of influence* Also, a degree of generality is likely to occur

because of the visibility of certain issues, and the existence of actors with

higher levels of general influence in the community. It would appear, however,

that leadership pools characterized by large size, institutional dominance,

high legitimacy, high visibility, narrow scope of influence, low cohesiveness,

low entrenchment, and a cosmopolitan orientation would tend to perceive and

define problems that were specific to various institutions,, This institutional

specificity would likely occur from the fractionated, pluralistic, polythic

nature of such a leadership pool. Where the power actors exercise influence

in a specific institutional sphere, and the leadership pool is clique-ridden

and factional, the actors have less opportunity to become aware of and

knowledgeable about problems in other areas. Furthermore, the actors1
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interests are so deeply embedded in a specific institutional sphere that it

is not surprising that it should serve as the locus of the problems thev

perceive as being urgent. Basically, any characteristic of the leadership

pool which would tend to focus and limit the power actorsf influence and

activity to a specific institutional area, would also tend to increase the

institutional specificity of the perceived problems* In such a leadership

pool, llmyopia11 may be a common condition•

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the greater the degree of

institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool,

the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems,

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the lesser

the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the greater the degree of

institutional specificity in the perceived problemso

The more visible the leadership pool, the greater the degree of insti­

tutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of influence of the leadership pool, the lesser

the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of insti­

tutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of insti­

tutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the greater the degree of

institutional specificity in the perceived problemso
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This dimension also has particular relevance as an independent variable®

The degree of institutional specificity would appear to influence various

patterns of the proposed ameliorative activity. Where the perceived problems

are located within specific institutional spheres, the level of consensus

within the leadership pool probably will be lessened. Furthermore, the tasks

of establishing priorities, allocating resources, and instituting ameliorative

action will become more difficult. In such a situation, conflict is likelyo

Reconciliation is difficult, and inactivity may result* Also, such variables

as the level of required coordination among the various institutions to suc­

cessfully implement the proposals would appear to be affected. As a general

proposition one might offer that the more institutionally specific the per­

ceived problems, the greater the difficulty in successfully implementing the

proposed action.

F, The Possibility of Local Solution

Certain problems may be defined by the leadership pool as being solvable

at the local level -- by the local community. Hie power actors believe that

these types of problems are the responsibility of the local community; not

non-local state, regional, or national agencies. Furthermore, it is perceived

that the local community possesses the necessary material resources, skills,

and knowledge to undertake a solution. Such problems as downtown traffic

congestion, zoning, school curriculum reform, integration of public facilities,

and the extension of sewer and water lines are examples of types of problems

for which there may be purely local solutions« On the other hand, a local

solution may be defined as impossible. Certain problems, although existent

within the community, may not be considered as the community1 s responsibility.

Furthermore, the nature of other problems may be such that the leadership pool
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does not believe that the local community, by itself9 has the ability to solve

them. The community is defined as lacking the requisite authority, resources,

skills, or knowledge# The solution to such problems lies either totally out­

side the local community, or within the local community, but requires extensive

external aid. Examples of such problems might include inflation, urban

renewal, school construction, long-range planning, industrial development,

hospital construction, and poverty and unemployment. In effect, this variable

provides an indicator of the perceived "problem solving11 ability of the local

community.

The degree to which problems are defined as being solvable at the local

level would appear to be related to certain characteristics of the leadership

pool. Those characteristics which would tend to limit the power actor's

knowledge about the total resources available in the community and/or increase

his knowledge about the possible external sources of aid available to the com­

munity apparently would have particular relevance. Both of these conditions

should increase external aid. Such characteristics, therefore, as the degree

of cosmopolitanism, the level of cohesiveness, the extent of entrenchment, and

the scope of influence within the leadership pool should become manifest as

important antecedent determinants. The relationship, however, of other

characteristics, such as the degree of visibility and institutional dominance,

is not clear* The existence and direction of such associations cannot be

determined prior to the empirical application of the modelo Once again, the

following propositions must be considered as illustrative and highly tentative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the lower the

proportion of locally solvable problems.
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The broader the scope of influence in the leadership pool, the higher

the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of

locally solvable problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of

locally solvable problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of

locally solvable problems.

Various characteristics of the proposed ameliorative action would appear

to be influenced by this dimension. In fact, this dimension may be the most

crucial antecedent determinant. Obviously, the level of inactivity will be

affected* The extent to which the leadership pool defines and proposes "no

action" as possible, should be influenced by this definitional dimension.,

Where the local community is not defined as the viable locus for solution,

the degree of inactivity will likely increaseo Other action patterns, how­

ever, would also appear to be affected. The association with the proposed

degree of external aid considered essential to solve the problem is practically

tautological. The perceived relevance of local organizations and the possi­

bility of blockage by local individuals and groups also would appear to be

negatively associated with the degree of local solution. Also, the perceived

extent of governmental as opposed to private responsibility would appear to

be influenced by this dimension* We will further explicate the associations

in the next chapter.

G, The Degree of Uniqueness in the Problem Definitions

Leadership pools may vary in the extent to which they define local com­

munity problems as being unique to their community, as opposed to neighboring
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or similar communities. Some pools may define their problems as unique.

Others may view them as similar to those faced by other, salient commurities.

Certain conditions, such as a lack of industrial development, needed zoning

reform, or the need for the construction of a flood wall may be truly idiosyn­

cratic to the community. Other issues, such as crime and delinquency, adequate

governmental financing, and school construction are likely to be present in

other communities. The important variable, however, is the extent to which

the leadership pool perceives the problems as being unique -- whether or not

they actually are. In communities with a high degree of uniquely defined

problems, one can expect the leadership pool to look within the community

both for causal factors and for ameliorative action. If there is something

"uniquely wrong" within the community, less reliance might be placed upon the

aid, experience, and knowledge of external sources.

The structure of leadership in the community would appear to influence

the defined degree of uniqueness in the community problems. The social class

level and degree of cosmopolitanism are characteristics of the leadership pool

that should influence the extent of uniqueness. Educational level is an

important indicator of social class levelo This variable, and cosmopolitanism,

might serve to broaden the interests and knowledge of the leadership pool. A

leadership pool characterized by high social class and a cosmopolitan orien­

tation, therefore, might tend to define proportionately fewer problems as

being unique to the local community. Entrenchment apparently represents another

crucial determinant. Where the power actors in a leadership pool have spent a

large proportion of their life within the local community, they may be less

knowledgeable about the conditions in otherareas. If they exhibit a strong

personal identification with the local area, they might be expected to define
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its problems as being unique. The relationships between uniqueness and the

other characteristics of the leadership pool lack face validity. The only

clue to the association might be found in the possible interrelatedness of

certain of the characteristics. If: entrenchment, broad scope of influence,

and high cohesiveness are positively associated, then these latter character­

istics also may increase the degree of uniqueness. This statement represents,

however, pure speculation. These associations and interrelationships have

never before been conceptually posed or empirically examined0

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived

problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the more unique the per­

ceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived

problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived

problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the less unique

the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived

problems.

As an independent variable, this dimension would appear to have utility

for explaining certain characteristics of the proposed ameliorative action.

We might assume that the most crucial dependent characteristic would be the

locus of action* If the community problems are defined as unique, there may

be a greater tendency to attempt to solve them within the local community,
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without reliance on outside sources of aid. The perceived relevance of local

organizations, the degree of urgency in implementing an action program, and the

level of inactivity are other examples of possible dependent characteristics.

H. The Clarity of the Problem Definitions

The set of problems perceived by the leadership pool may vary in the

degree of clarity exhibited in their definitions. By clarity, we are referring

to the extent to which they are viewed in specific cause and effect termso

Certain problems may be defined as having single or multiple specific ''causes'1.

The "cause" of water pollution in the local river may be the dumping of waste

materials into the stream by the local rendering plant. The "cause11 of an

inadequate sewage system may be the refusal of the city council to appropriate

the needed funds. The "causes11 of local racial discontent may be "the segre­

gated municipal swimming pool and the discriminatory hiring practices in the

local plants". In defining these problems, the power actors in the leadership

pool offer concrete, specific, factors as being the causes of the problems.

In their definitions, they exhibit a belief in specifically what conditions

are bringing about the problems. Furthermore, in so doing they specify what

conditions in the community must be altered to ameliorate the problems.

Other problems, however, may be defined as having "no cause", or causal

relationships may be proposed in highly amorphous, abstract, and general termin­

ology. In these definitions the power actors are not able to pinpoint "causes",

or attribute cause to such general conditions as "apathy", "growth", or "the

sexual revolution". In the former instance, there exists a fairly direct

association within the power actor83 definition between the specific cause and

the problematic effect. In the latter situation, the association is much less

direct; several intervening factors and relationships seem to be missing. An

-66­

example of such a general, causal imputation would be positing "basic human

nature" as the cause of urban blight.

The degree of clarity in the leadership pool's definitions would appear

to be influenced by various characteristics of the pool. Once again., we

find that those characteristics which indicate greater knowledge of, interest

in, and identification with the community are particularly important* The

social class level, degree of cosmopolitanism, and level of entrenchment are

such characteristics. A leadership pool with high social status and a high

level of entrenchment might be expected to offer a higher proportion of

clearly defined problems. If the pool is extremely cosmopolitan, however,

and has little interest in the local community (a rather unlikely occurrence)

the proportion might be lower. In addition, the characteristic of visibility

would appear to be positively associated with the proportion of clearly defined

problems. A visible leadership pool is a target* Individuals and groups with

problematic concerns or "beefs" can identify whom to contact to "have something

done"*, Because of these sources of information, a visible pool may be more

knowledgeable about the conditions in the local system than a covert one.

Increased knowledge may be manifested in clearer definitions. Likewise, a

high level of cohesiveness facilitates the exchange of information and opinion

among the power actors. Serving as another source of information, it may also

be positively associated with our dependent dimension* Due to a lack of

previous conceptualization or empirical study within this area, we must, however,

emphasize the tentative nature of the following illustrative propositions.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of

clearly defined problems.
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The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, thehigher the

proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly

defined problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of

clearly defined problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of

clearly defined problems*

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of

clearly defined problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of

clearly defined problems.

This dimension would appear to affect the likelihood of any action being

proposed to ameliorate the defined problem. If the leadership pool is unable

to impute a causal association, or where the causal association offered is

abstract and amorphous, the level of inactivity might be expected to be high.

If the leadership pool defines a specific cause to a problem, it seems probable

that they would be more likely to propose such a causal association. In the

former situation, the leadership pool, by their own definitions, has isolated

contributory factors to the problematic condition. Offering proposals for

ameliorative action would appear to be facilitated by the existence of visible,

specific targets for change« Other patterns of proposed action, such as the

relevance of local organizations for successful implementation and the perceived

threat of blockage, might also be influenced by the degree of clarity within the

definitions.
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In this section we have presented seven community problem dimensions*

These dimensions include: (1) the number of perceived problems, (2) the

perceived seriousness of the problems, (3) the degree of consensus concerning

the perceived problems, (4) the degree of institutional specificity versus

community generality evidenced in the perception of the problem, (5) the

defined possibility of local solution, (6) the degree of uniqueness in the

problem definitions, and (7) the clarity of the problem definitions« These

dimensions were defined, explicated, related as dependent variables to the

characteristics of the leadership pool, justified for inclusion as independent

variables of the patterns of ameliorative action. The perceived problems of

any leadership pool can be classified along these dimensions• Thus a "problem

set11 may be classified as large, not serious, of low consensus, institutionally

specific, not solvable at the local level, not unique, and not clearly defined -­

or any other combination of the above dimensions. These dimensions are tenta­

tively proposed. Empirical application will determine their utility.

Figure 3 represents a matrix presentation of the proposed relationships

between the characteristics of the leadership and the community problem dimen­

sions. These propositions are highly tentative and heuristic. They await

empirical validation.

Finally, we must note the possibility of covariance between these community

problem dimensions. All of our "dimension sets" may covary. The level of

covariance is an empirical issue.

Patterns of Community Action

The last section of our model relates to the action proposed by the

leadership pool to ameliorate their perceived problems. This final set of
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variables is very important. It truly indicates "where the action is!" We

will offer seven variable patterns or characteristics for classifying tMs

action. This set has theoretical importance. It is the final element in our

processual model. The characteristics of the proposed action would appear to

be strongly influenced by the perception and definition of community problems

by the leadership pool- Furthermore, one can surmise that the patterns taken

by this action will affect the structure of the community. For example, let

us suppose that the leadership pool proposes that a large amount of non-local,

external aid in the form of resources, skill and knowledge, or authorization

is required to ameliorate the local problems. The degree of local community

autonomy may be lowered if such a proposal is undertaken. These patterns of

action, therefore, are intimately related to change within the system. They

are offered to alter conditions within the system.

These characteristics also have practical importance. If an actor wants

to institute ameliorative action or social change within the system, the classi­

fication of proposals and explication of their associations with the leadership

pool's perception and definition of problems should prove to be relevant and

valuable« A better understanding of certain key dimensions of community action

proposals should aid the actor in instituting purposeful social change.

In selecting these patterns, we faced the same problems that were

noted in the selection of the community problem dimensions. Practically no

previous conceptual or empirical studies have attempted to develop action

patterns, let alone examine their relationships to the perception and definition

of local problems.

In selecting the action patterns we first sought variables that would

tap crucial elements of any proposed action. Crucial elements were defined
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as those which appeared relevant to the involvement of local units in the

proposed activity. Such dimensions as the extent of required coordination

among local institutions, the relevance of local organizations, the perceived

possibility of one or a few actors "blocking" or defeating the proposals, etc. >

fulfilled this requirement. Second, we attempted to include variables that

would be as encompassing of as many aspects of community action as possible.

Finally, the variables had to be at a level of generality and abstractness that

they could be applied to any proposed ameliorative action. Our patterns of

community action can be applied to such varied proposals and projects as the

"bussing11 of students to achieve racial balance in the schools, the development

of an industrial park, the floating of a school bond issue, the recruitment of

public servants, the restructuring of the local government, the construction

of a floodwall, the renovation of the downtown business district, the building

of single family rental units, or the assassination of the mayor.

The seven patterns of community action include: (1) the urgency or

immediacy of instituting the proposals, (2) the degree of institutional coor­

dination required to successfully implement the program, (3) the degree of

public versus private responsibility for action, (4) the perceived relevance of

local organizations, (5) the proposed degree of external, non-local involvement

in the ameliorative action, (6) the perceived possibility of "blockage" by

one or a few actors, and (7) the level of inactivity. In this section we will

define these variables, explicate their relevance to the model, relate them to

the perception and definition of local problems, and suggest possible operational

indicators for their measurement.

Before considering these specific patterns, however, let us define and

briefly explicate the nature of our general concept, i.e., community action.
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A. Definition

We shall define community action as those ACTIVITIES OR INACTIVITIES THAT

ARE PROPOSED BY THE LEADERSHIP POOL, REQUIRE LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT, AND

ARE OFFERED TO AMELIORATE PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND THEREBY AFFECT

THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM.

Our definition begins by labeling as community action those ACTIVITIES

OR INACTIVITIES THAT ARE PROPOSED BY THE LEADERSHIP POOL. An obvious, logical

question is "why include inactivity in a discussion of community action?"

There may be occasions when power actors in the leadership pool propose a

"do nothing11 policy to "solve" certain problems. There are numerous situations

in which the power actors may propose "inactivity" as the most appropriate

action. A power actor may perceive and define a problem as existing within

the community, but it is not yet a public issue• If public disclosure and

subsequent ameliorative action are defined by the power actor as being opposed

to his "best interests," inactivity may be an attractive proposal. Political

graft and corruption on the part of local political officials, discriminatory

hiring practices by local unions, price fixing and collusion by local business­

men, and the pollution of the local waterways by the communityrs industries are

a few examples of such types of problems. Often the power actors seem to be

saying, "let's do nothing, maybe nobody will notice, and eventually the problem

will fsolve' itself. Above all, let's not get hurt!" Such proposals have

implications for the future structure and processes in the community, and

thereby qualify as action in our model.

Other situations may also lead, however, to the proposal of inactivity.

Certain issues may be defined by the power actors as problems, but they are
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too "hot,11 too controversial. Local segregation practices, fluoridation of

the water system, and the institution of a city incoiae tax may represent such

issues. The power actors do define these conditions as local problems. Due

to a number of factors, however (not the least of which may be their vested

interests in the community system), they propose inactivity to "solve11 them.

Such comments as "The time is not right, maybe in a year or so we will be

ready to tackle that one," or "Yes, it's a bad situation, but there is no use

in creating a bloody fight within this town, besides it will probably iron

itself out," are often presented to justify the proposed inactivity. Of

course, the power actors may believe that a condition is problematic, but

that "benign neglect" is the best policy. Placing their faith in the "benov­

olence of evolution," these actors basically propose that "time will heal all

wounds."

Proposals of inactivity occur at all levels, within all systems. They

appear most likely to occur when other forms of action are defined by the

power actors as detrimental to their vested interests. Whether it be a "sug­

gestion" offered by a presidential advisor, or a "stalling tactic" by the

president of the local chemical company, inactivity is a proposal that can

influence the system. We will consider such a proposal as a form of community

action.

To be considered as community action, however, a proposed ameliorative

program must REQUIRE LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT, Certain proposals may

require action exclusively within and by the local community and its insti­

tutions. The institution of a one-way street system to relieve downtown

congestion may be such a problem. Other community action may be sanctioned,

funded, developed, and accomplished predominately by external, non-local
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agents• In certain instances an entire program from conception to conclusion

may be controlled by non-local units. The locating and building of an inter­

state highway on the periphery of the community may be such an act. To be

considered as community action, however, the activity must (1) have its ulti­

mate locus of change within the community system, and (2) require at least some

involvement by the local community actors. For example let us return to our

illustration of the interstate highway. It is possible that the local leader­

ship pool defined "geographic isolation11 and inadequate long-distance highways

as a community problem. As at least a partial solution, they may have proposed

the building of a modern highway. Due to the cost of construction, a lack of

knowledge, experience, and local authority, etc., this ameliorative action

could not obviously be undertaken alone by the local community. As a solution,

therefore, the power actors may have lobbied and attempted to influence the

outside agencies to locate the highway near the community and provide an

interchange for local use. Such activity would be classified as community

action, because it included local involvement. On the other hand, the local

actors may have suddenly found out that an interstate highway was going to be

constructed near their community. The local actors may have taken no action

to influence this construction. Furthermore, they may never have perceived

any reaction or involvement as necessary. In this instance, this construction

would not be classified as community action.

Finally, we note that these community actions ARE OFFERED TO AMELIORATE

PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND THEREBY AFFECT THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES

IN THE SYSTEM. Briefly, there are two points to emphasize in these phrases.

First, what we are defining as community actions are those proposed activities

that are related to the power actors1 perceived and defined problems0 For
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the purposes of our model, these are the relevant activities . They are

"problem-linked.™ Second, we are asserting that these ameliorative actions

are intimately related to the process of social change within the community.

These actions are aimed at altering the existing conditions in the community;

they are agents of social change.

Let us now turn to our seven patterns of action*, These dimensions will

be defined, explicated, and related to the community problem dimensions•

B. The Urgency or Immediacy of Instituting

the Ameliorative Action

Among the possible patterns of variation among action proposals is the

perceived urgency or immediacy of implementing them. Certain problems may

require immediate action. Conditions posing extreme stress on the local

community in general, and those that exhibit a rapid onset and are diffuse

throughout the community in particular, are these types of problems. The

most urgent action is required to contend with conditions that are defined

by the power actors as "disastrous-!f A natural disaster or civil disturbance

obviously requires urgent, immediate ameliorative activity. Other conditions,

however, though less dramatic, may be equally in need of an urgent solution.

It would appear that those conditions which are perceived to (1) manifestly

threaten life, property, and/or community values and mores, or (2) greatly

disturb the normal conditions in the local system, or (3) directly threaten

the vested interests of the power actors, would be urgently attacked. The

emergency passage of a bond issue to "keep the schools open," the securing of

a restraining order to halt a wildcat strike, the enactment of emergency

resolutions to repair a weakened water system, a special recall election to

remove corrupt officials, and the effort to attract new industry to ease a
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crucial problem of unemployment caused by the loss of the community's major

industrial plant, may be examples of urgent action. Other types of action,

however, may not have to be immediately undertaken. Certain conditions may

be perceived and defined by the power actors as problems, however they do not

meet the above criteria and therefore a solution is not proposed as being

urgently needed. Efforts to promote "culture" within the community, the

construction of a neighborhood park, or the development of a master plan are

a few examples.

The degree of urgency inherent in the ameliorative action is a crucial

variable. Where the need for action is immediate, stress is placed upon

those actors and organizations defined as relevant and responsible for the

activity. With a demand to "do something -- now!" such relevant units must

develop plans and tactics, procure requisite resources, coordinate activity3

and perform other needed tasks under duress. The possibility of successful

implementation obviously is influenced by this dimension.

Some might propose that the nature of the problematic condition determines

the degree of urgency in the ameliorative action. It would appear, however,

that the degree of urgency is influenced by the perception and definition of

the problems by the leadership pool -- not anything inherent in the problem

itself. The same condition may be proposed as requiring immediate action in

one community, while in another it is not defined as urgent* What is crucial

is how the problem is defined. The degree of seriousness perceived in the

problem is an obvious determinant of the degree of urgency in the solution.

The more serious the perceived set of problems, the more urgent the proposed

solutions. Other community problem dimensions, however, would also appear to

be associated with the degree of urgency* If a large number of different
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problems are perceived, the degree of overall urgency might be expected to

be low. In such communities, there are few "overriding,*1 paramount problems.

The degree of institutional specificity might be assumed to be positively

associated with the degree of urgency. Issues centered within the power

actor's sphere of influence are likely to be seen as urgent. Problems, however,

which are clearly defined and unique may be positively associated with the

proposed immediacy of the ameliorative action. Where the problems are not

defined in specific cause and effect terms, the implementation of immediate

action is difficult. Furthermore, the more unique the problems, the more

urgent the action. Routine problematic conditions, those found in most

communities, may be handled through time by institutional means. It is the

condition that is defined as unique that may require immediate attention.

We must note that the above discussion of proposed associations is based

upon studied thought and the general deductive scheme inherent in the model.

The discussion assumes a degree of covariance among the community problem

dimensions. There is a dearth of theoretical or empirical studies to guide

the exposition of such associations. In certain instances, the existence and

direction of the assumed association cannot be predicted prior to empirical

examination. Therefore, the following list of propositions may be viewed as

heuristic. They are offered to stimulate thought and to allow for empirical

examination.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the less urgent the proposed

ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed

ameliorative action.
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The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems,

the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed

ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the more urgent

the proposed ameliorative action.

G. The Degree of Institutional Coordination Required to

Successfully Implement the Proposed Ameliorative Action

An important characteristic of action proposals is the degree to which

they require coordination among the various institutions in the community.

Certain problems may be solved by action located within only a single insti­

tution. Other sub-units in the community system may not be defined as being

relevant or responsible actors. These proposals, while offered by the power

actors to ameliorate conditions they have perceived and defined as "community"

problems, are actually "business/1 "industry," "government," or "school"

concerns. Other proposals, however, may require the involvement and coordi­

nated activity of two, three, or more institutional areas. Certain patterns

of community action may come close to involving the total community. For

example, in one community the action proposed to rebuild the downtown area

required the involvement of over six different institutional sphereso Busi­

ness, industry, government, mass media, and the financial sectors, as one

might expect, were involved. In addition, the local school system and college

were also participants• Such an action program requires a great deal of

coordination among the community sub-units. Its implementation presents

different problems to those attempting institute change than a program that

is the responsibility of "business" or "the schools."
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This characteristic has utility for action analysis because it represents

a crucial determinant of successful implementation. To a certain extent,

this characteristic is an indicator of the complexity of the issue. When

the local government can develop and initiate the action, secure the necessary

human and material resources for its implementation, and perform all the

requisite tasks from the point of problem recognition to the stage of problem

solution, the action can be viewed as less complex than when other institutional

areas in the community must also participate. As different institutional areas

become involved, coordination among these actors becomes more problematic. The

horizontal" network within the community is ffput to the test." The true,

functional viability of the local community comes under examination. As

more elements of the horizontal network become active participants in the

action, the tasks of securing cooperation among the actors, developing

consensus regarding priorities, establishing tactics and strategies, allocating

tasks and roles to the participants, procuring and distributing resources,

implementing and coordinating the activity, and dividing the rewards and

sanctions (i.e., who gets the credit, and/or who gets blamed?11) become more

difficult. One might propose, therefore, that the degree of institutional

coordination is negatively associated with the probability of successful

implementation.

The degree of institutional coordination inherent in any instance of

community action proposed by the power actors would appear to be strongly

influenced by their perception and definition of community problems. Such

community problem dimensions as the perceived seriousness of the problems,

the degree of consensus concerning the nature and severity of the problems,

the perceived possibility of local solution, the degree of uniqueness, and
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the clarity of the definitions might be positively associated with the degree

of institutional coordination in the proposed ameliorative action. Although

severe problems may be ameliorated by the action of a single institution,

where the percentage of problems perceived as severe is high, coordinated

activity is likely to be proposed. Similarly, where there is a high degree

of consensus on the severity of the problem set, coordinated activity is

probable, as representatives of the different institutional areas in the

leadership pool illustrate a margin of agreement about what problems should

be attacked. If the problems are clearly defined, viewed as unique, but

perceived as solvable by the local community, the power actors may propose

a more massive program to solve them. Such a program may require greater

institutional coordination. Obviously, however, the degree of institutional

specificity inherent in the problem definitions would appear to be negatively

associated with this action characteristic.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more serious the perceived problems, the greater the degree of insti­

tutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the

greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed

ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the

lesser the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed

ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the greater the

degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative

action.
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The more unique the perceived problems, the greater the degree of insti­

tutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the greater the

degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The degree of institutional coordination defined as requisite by the

power actors can be indicated by determining hich institutions they perceived

as being relevant and responsible for solving their problems.

D. The Degree of Public versus Private

Responsibility for Action

Proposals for ameliorative community action may differ with respect to

the degree to which the power actors define them as "public" (i.e., govern­

mentally as opposed to "private11 concerns). The solution to certain problems

may be defined as purely a governmental concern. Other problems, however, may

be considered by the power actors as conditions requiring action by "private"

citizens. The extent of defined "public," governmental responsibility for

community action would appear to be an important characteristic of any com­

munity's action set.

This characteristic of the community's horizontal pattern is especially

relevant to our model. This model is offered to be utilized in the compara­

tive examination of community power. One of the central issues of debate

within the area of community power is the relative influence and decision-

making ability of the local governmental and political institutions as opposed

to the economic, industrial, and financial sphereo This characteristic was

included in the model primarily because of its relevance to this issue. It

offers an action-based indicator within a reputational framework of the

defined responsibility of these two spheres. Furthermore, this characteristic
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is directly relevant to the analysis of the possibility of successful implemen­

tation of the proposed ameliorative action. In empirically applying this

model, the researcher is able to determine the relative power of these

spheres in the local community. Such characteristics of the leadership pool

as institutional dominance, legitimacy, visibility, and scope offer direct

indicators of this power differential. In attempting to predict the outcome

of proposed ameliorative action, these dimensions, in association with the

relative degree of public versus private responsibility, provide extremely

useful guidelines. For example, in one community the leadership pool may be

dominated by the business and industrial institutions, with little represen­

tation by the governmental officials. The leadership pool in this community

may also be non-legitimate, invisible, and characterized by a broad scope of

influence. The "public11 sector in such a community would be subordinate in

power to the "private" sphereP Ameliorative action defined by the power

actors as being the sole responsibility of the "government" in such a community,

would not be as likely to succeed as that which is perceived as a "private11

concern. This characteristic, therefore, is a crucial dimension for action

analysis.

The nature of the problematic conditions in the community, however, is

not the crucial determinant of the degree of "public" versus "private" respon­

sibility. The solution to the same problem (e«g. , water pollution) may be

defined as a "public" matter in one community, and as a "private" concern.

in another. What would appear to be a crucial antecedent determinant of this

characteristic, however, is the manner in which the leadership pool perceived

and defined the local community problems. Unfortunately, there has been no

prior study of the association between these dimensions. As a dependent
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variable, this characteristic offers the most difficult problems for analyzing

its relationship to the determinant dimensions. The nature and direction of

the associations between this characteristic and such community problem dimen­

sions as consensus, local solution, uniqueness, and clarity, cannot be

predicted prior to empirical examination. Ihese associations, however, due

to the deductive nature of the model, can be empirically examined. The direc­

tion of other associations, however, can be tentatively proposed on the basis

of extrapolations from general sociological findings in the community power

literature. For example, as we have noted, many studies have emphasized the

dominance of power and decision-making ability held by the economic institution

within the local community. It is this sector that often has been defined as

possessing the greatest ability to uget things done -- especially those things

that it defines as important and desirous." Therefore, we might propose that

the greater the perceived seriousness of the local problems, the smaller the

degree of defined "public" responsibility for action. Other community problem

dimensions, such as the number of problems and the degree of institutional

specificity inherent in the definitions, may also be negatively associated

with this dimension. The following propositions, however, are tentative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the number of perceived problems, the smaller the degree of

defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative actiono

The more serious the perceived problems, the smaller the degree of

defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the

smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.
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E. The Perceived Relevance of

Local Community Organizations

Our model contains a third pattern of action that is relevant to the

horizontal network of the community. This characteristic refers to the

degree to which the power actors define local community organizations as

being relevant for the successful implementation of the proposed action.

This dimension is interrelated with the preceding two patterns, but it taps

different elements of the action. All three of these dimensions are partial

indicators of the degree of intra-coramunity, or horizontal involvement. With

this third characteristic, however, organizational relevance, as opposed to

institutional involvement or "sector" responsibility, is specifically indicated.

For certain action proposals, the perceived relevance of various local

community organizations may be low« The involvement of only one or a few

organizations may be defined as essential by the power actors for a successful

solution. On the other hand, a proposal for ameliorative action may be defined

as requiring the active involvement and support of numerous local organizations.

Whether the action set is characterized by low or high local organizational

relevance would appear to influence such other patterns as the degree of

requisite coordination and the possibility of successful implementation. Along

these dimensions, this characteristic is very similar to the preceding two

variables.

This characteristic, however, has utilitarian value along another dimen­

sion. It offers an index of the leadership pool's perception of the viability

and influence of various local organizations. If the leadership pool of a

community perceived that the local organizations are strong, viable entities

which can provide support or opposition to any proposed action, the perceived
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level of organizational relevance will probably be high* This pattern

especially may be pronounced where local organizations have been active

participants in prior issues and programs. In effect they have proven

their ability to l8muster the forces" to aid or hinder action proposals.

Therefore, because of its utility as an indicator of perceived local organi­

zational viability, and its relevance for predicting the outcome of action

proposals, we have included this characteristic in our model.

The perception and definition of local problems by the leadership pool

would appear to be a determinant of the perceived relevance of local community

organizations. Most of our community problem dimensions, with the exception

of institutional specificity, would appear to be positively associated with

this characteristic. Local community organizations possess human and material

resources that may be relevant to the successful implementation of any amelio­

rative proposal. Where problems are perceived as serious, and especially

where they are defined as solvable by the local community, a large number of

local organizations is likely to be perceived as relevant to their solution.

Furthermore, where the leadership pool illustrates a high degree of consensus

and a clear understanding of the specific causal factors involved in the prob­

lems, the number of perceived, relevant organizations may be high. Problems

perceived and defined in this manner are "ready to be attacked.11 The utility

of the organizations1 resources for ameliorating the specific problematical

conditions may result in their being more salient to the leadership pool.

Where there is little agreement or understanding about the nature of the

problems, however, fewer organizations may be viewed as relevant. Finally,

if institutionally specific problems are perceived, the degree to which general

community organizations will be viewed as relevant will probably be low.
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Illustrative Propositions:

The more serious the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance

of local community organizations,,

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the

greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the

lesser the perceived relevance of local community organizationso

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the greater the

perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The more unique the perceived problems, the greater the perceived rele­

vance of local community organizations,,

The more clearly defined the perceived problems, the greater the perceived

relevance of local community organizations,

F, The Proposed Degree of Externala Non-Local

Involvement in the Ameliorative Action

In our preceding discussion of community action we noted that such action

had its ultimate locus of change within the local community. Furthermore,

the participation and involvement of local community units was defined as

requisite for such action. Community action, however, may differ in the

extent to which the leadership pool defines external, non-local assistance as

necessary for its successful implementation. Certain proposals may be defined

as requiring no external involvement. The power actors in such situations

apparently perceive that the local community possesses the necessary resources,

skills, knowledge, and authority to successfully undertake the proposed action.

At the other extreme are those problematic conditions that are perceived to

be existent within the community, but whose solutions are defined as being
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outside the local comnunity's boundaries or control. Inflation may be such

a problem. The ameliorative action proposed to solve such problems may be

defined by the leadership pool as being totally the responsibility of external

units. Of course, a great deal of community action will fall somewhere

between these two extremes. The proposal may be defined as the responsibility

of the local community with the assistance of outside units, or vice versa.

This dimension has been included in the model because of its importance

as an indicator of local autonomy and its utility for the analysis of com­

munity action proposals. Unlike the preceding three characteristics which

were related to the horizontal network, this dimension is relevant to the

vertical axis of the community. It can be utilized to measure the strength

of this vertical axis within the community. As such, it indicates the relative

degree of local autonomy. For example, the action set, as defined by the

leadership pool, may exhibit a high degree of external, non-local involvement

in the solution of local community problems. One may propose that the present

structure of such a community is dependent upon non-local agencies, i.e., it is

non-autonomous. Furthermore, one may infer that the future structure of the

community will be at least as dependent as it is currently, and possibly

more so due to the projected non-local involvement in the proposed ameliorative

action. The characteristic also is valuable in predicting the outcome of

the action proposals. For example, suppose that the leadership pool perceived

a high level of severity in the problem set, however, they do not define non-

local involvement as being required to solve them. A potential bountiful

supply of resources, knowledge, and skill thus is defined by the local power

actors as being "not needed'1 to solve their problems. In so doing, one may

predict that they lessen their chance for successful amelioration. This
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characteristic, therefore, taps two vital elements of any cotnmunity action-

It offers an indication of the likelihood of success, and presents a picture

of ideal viability, i.e., it offers at least a partial answer to the question,

"Can the community solve the problem itself?11

Whether or not non-local assistance is defined as necessary would appear

to be influenced by the power actor!s perception and definition of local

problems. The most crucial antecedent determinant of this dependent charac­

teristic would obviously be the defined local solvability of the problems.

In fact, at first glance such an association may appear to be tautological.

It is not. Problems may be defined as solvable by the local community.

Such a definition, however, does not prevent the ameliorative action proposal

from including a great amount of external, non-local assistance. One would

expect to find, however, a strong, negative association between these variables,

The perceived level of severity within the problem set, as noted above, would

appear to be positively associated with this characteristic. Also the number

of perceived problems and their degree of institutional specificity would

appear to be positively associated with the level of non-local involvement

in the action proposals. As the number of perceived problems increases, it

would appear likely that the degree to which the local community is defined

as being able to solve them by itself will decrease. Where problems are

defined in an institutionally specific manner, the relevance of the horizontal

network within the community may not be salient to the leadership pool. In

such a situation, they may turn to the vertical axis, particularly to those

ties with non-local units existent within their institutional spheres• Other

associations also may be deductively drawn from the model, e.g., a negative

association between the degree of perceived uniqueness in the problems and
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the level of non-local involvement in their solutions. These propositions

are, however, heuristic* They are proposed to stimulate comparative empirical

study within this area* The strength they contain comes from their place in

the deductive model; they share in the validation of every other proposition.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the number of perceived problems, the higher the level of

non-local involvement in the ameliorative actiono

The more serious the perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local

involvement in the ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the

higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action*

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the lower the

level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the lower the level of non-local

involvement in the ameliorative action*

G. The Perceived Possibility of "Blockage11

These last two patterns are included in the model because of their

relevance for understanding and predicting the possibility of successfully

implementing the action program. This sixth pattern also is important for

its relationship to the distribution of power within the community. Basically

n
at issue is the presence of veto power11 within the community. By "blockage11

we are referring to the act of opposing, stalling, and successfully defeating

any proposal for ameliorative action.

Conmunities differ in the extent to which their action sets are "blockage­

prone*lf In one community, the power actors may perceive the possibility of

one actor, a coalition of actors, or a more formalized group opposing and

-90­

defeating any action. A system in such a state has an inordinate amount of

power-relevant resources in the possession of a few actors. Also, the

probability that they may utilize the resources to "block11 any proposal may

be predicted by the leadership pool based upon the pool's definition of

local problems in combination with its knowledge of the vested interests of

the opposition. In another community, the amelioration of only certain

perceived problems may be defined as facing possible "blockage." In such

instances, no power actor is powerful enough to defeat any and all proposals.

Furthermore, in such communities the power actors may be uninterested in

blocking action proposals that do not directly affect their interests.

For the researcher interested in predicting the outcome of community

action, this characteristic has obvious merit. Any action proposal that is

defined by the leadership pool as possibly being opposed and defeated by

certain power actors in the community has a smaller probability of success

than one which does not face such perceived obstacles.

While the structure of power in the community is obviously a determinant

of the perceived possibility of "blockage," so too are the power actors8 per­

ception and definition of local problems. For example, such community problem

dimensions as the degree of perceived severity inherent in the problems and

the level of the power actors1 consensus concerning the nature of the problems

would appear to be negatively associated with this dependent pattern* If

the problem set is perceived by the leadership pool as being very serious, one

can assume that the premium on ameliorative action will be high. In such a

situation it may be more difficult for an actor to defeat or "veto" the

ameliorative proposal. Furthermore, to do so may entail the loss of potentially

valuable resource bases for the future exercise of power. Likewise, if the
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leadership pool basically is in agreement about the nature and severity of

the problem set, the probability that one of them would "buck the tide" and

attempt to defeat the proposed action is low* In such cases the existence

of consensus on the part of the power actors is itself potentially an

extremely powerful resource. Consensus fosters the formation of coalitions

and aids the exchange of relevant resources. To attempt to oppose a proposal

offered by a consensually based leadership pool may be a folly* On the

other hand, such dimensions as the number of problems and the degree of

institutional specificity would appear to be positively associated with the

perceived probability of "blockage.11 The larger the number of problems, the

greater the probability that some action proposal may be defined as salient

to some power actor's vested interests. Furthermore, if the problems are

defined in an institutionally specific manner, the likelihood of blockage

within a specific institutional area increases.

The above associations and the following propositions are illustrative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the greater the perceived

possibility of "blockage."

The more serious the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possi­

bility of "blockage.11

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the

lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage•"

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems,

the greater the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The more unique the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possi­

bility of "blockage."
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The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the lesser the

perceived possibility of "blockage •'*

EL The Level of Inactivity

The last characteristic in our set of action patterns, and also the last

variable in our model, is the level of inactivity within the set of proposed

community actions. This characteristic refers to the proportion of perceived

problems for which no action either has been initiated or proposed. It is

a dimension of the set of community actions, not of any single action proposal«

This dimension has been included in our model because of its obvious

relevance to the probability of successful implementation of community action.

It may be considered an indicator of the likelihood of success • Those

perceived problems for which (1) no ameliorative action has been undertaken,

and (2) the leadership pool offers no ameliorative proposals, are unlikely

to be solved in the immediate future. Furthermore, this variable serves as

an indicator of the "problem-solving ability11 of the leadership pool. If

the action set of a community exhibits a high level of inactivity, the

community's leadership pool may possibly lack "problem-solving ability."

While other variables may be determinants of the level of inactivity, the

leadership pool's perception and definition of problems also would appear to

be contributory factors. Throughout the discussion we have noted the associ­

ation between numerous characteristics and the likelihood of successful

implementation of the ameliorative action. We will not review these points

at this time, however, they do serve as the basis for the following proposi­

tions. Certain community problem dimensions, however, would appear to be

crucial determinants of the level of inactivity. Such dimensions as the

perceived degree of severity, the level of consensus, and the clarity of the
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problem definitions might be negatively associated with this variable.

These dimensions all are indicators of the necessity, urgency, and feasibility

of instituting ameliorative action. When the values of these dimensions are

high, there is a resultant increased demand for action. Local solvability

and uniqueness would also appear to be negatively associated with this dimen­

sion. We previously noted that if the coraiunity is defined as being function­

ally autonomous and able to solve the problems by itself at the local level,

the degree of inactivity would decrease. This negative association may

result from the lack of complication involved in not having to secure external

aid# Furthermore, if problems are defined as being unique, they are likely

to be seen as locally solvable. On the other hand, institutional specificity

and the number of problems would appear to be positively associated with the

level of inactivity.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the higher the level of

inactivity.

The more serious the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the

lower the level of inactivity.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the

higher the level of inactivity.

The greater the proportion of locally solvable problems, the lower the

level of inactivity.

The more unique the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the lower the level

of inactivity.

-94­

In this section we haVe presented the final component of our model.

We have defined our unit of analysis, i.e., community action, and presented

seven patterns or characteristics of that unit. Each of the characteristics

in the action set was defined, justified, and operationalized* Community

action can be classified along these dimensions. A proposal, for example,

may be urgent, require little institutional coordination, be viewed as the

responsibility of the local government, not require the involvement of many

local organizations, require a great deal of external, non-local assistance,

and have a high probability of being "blocked." Action sets similarly may

be classified.

In addition, possible associations between these characteristics and

the independent community problem dimensions were proposed. These propositions

are presented in matrix form in Figure 4. These associations are offered for

empirical examination. They are tentative and may be viewed as heuristic.

The development of these propositions could have been greatly facilitated by

the existence of previous literature in the field. There is none. In fact,

the farther we have moved from our first set of propositions (i.e. , the relation­

ship between community structural variables and the characteristics of the

leadership pool) the more tenuous have been the proposed associations.

These propositions have been developed on the basis of careful analysis utilizing

the logical deductive framework of the model.

Finally, although we have not posited these patterns of community action

as independent variables, they obviously are associated with the crucial

dependent variable of the likelihood of successful implementation. Given that

action within the community system may alter the structure and processes of

the system, these patterns may be viewed as related to the future structure

of the community. We have completed the circle.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS

TO THE PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY ACTION

Patterns of Community Action

Institut'l Public Organizatrl External

Urgency Coordinate Respon'y Relevance Involvement Blockage Inactivity

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relation­

ship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination

Summary

To reiterate, the model includes four sets of variables: (1) community

structural variables, (2) characteristics of the leadership pool, (3) com­

munity problem dimensions, and (4) patterns of community action* The general

theoretical assumption of this model is that community structural variables

influence the characteristics of the community leadership pool. Furthermore,

the characteristics of the leadership pool affect the manner in which the

local power actors perceive and define community problems. Finally, the

nature of these community problem definitions will influence the structure

of action proposed by the leadership pool to ameliorate these problems• In

the previous two chapters a total of thirty-three variables has been presented

under these general sets. Each of these variables has been defined, explicated,

justified, operationalized, and placed in the model as an independent and/or

dependent variable. These variables are not logically exhaustive. They have

been selected for their apparent utility as meaningful dimensions for examining

the interrelationships posed in this model. They are variables which are

important for the analysis of the distribution of power, the nature of problem

definitions, and the structure of community action. Furthermore, it is assumed

that these variables covary. The extent of these interrelationships, however,

must be determined by future empirical examination. Conceptually, the model

requires refinement. This is a first step in its development. For example,

some of the proposed associations, particularly those in the first set of

propositions, have at least some empirical support. We have noted this support

when it has been available. For many of the associations, however, no support

is available• These have been deductively drawn based upon the general
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theoretical assumptions of the model• They also await empirical examination.

Finally, as a practical tool the model is crucial for determining the 'problem-

solving ability and methods11 of the community leadership pool. Such knowledge

may be of paramount importance to anyone who wishes to institute ameliorative

action or social change within the local community.
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Part 2

Selected Empirical Applications
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The model presented in the previous section is comprehensive enough to

provide a guide for a variety of empirical applications* Three different

aspects are presented here. First, the variables used in the model are

described for six different cctnmunities -- four of them in the below 20,000

and two above. Second, in two of these communities, certain types of com­

munity action relating to water problems have been taken and certain preliminary

comments will be made about some of the factors involved in these decisions.

Third, certain findings relating to the perception of water problems in the

smaller communities will be compared with similar findings in the two larger

communities •

Testing the model previously presented requires the selection of com­

munities as units of analysis* To fully test the model would require a large

number of sample units observed over a long time period*. While this is an

ultimate goal, certain compromises have to be made to reduce the possibilities

of investigation to manageable size. As indicated above, six communities are

used here for analysis. These six communities have certain similarities in

common and also possess certain differences. They will be used to illustrate

both similarities and differences•

Selection of Communities

The first task was to select communities which were similar in certain

respects but also different in terms of certain objective conditions. One

set of communities involved four cities from 10,000 to 17,000 population

(see Figure 5), These were relatively autonomous communities, not closely

linked to a neighboring metropolitan area. They were also county seats.
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They differed, however, on the presence or absence of particular types of

community problems. One of these communities has historically had a number

of flooding problems; another, problems with flooding as well as pollution;

Figure 5

POPULATION SIZE AND RATE OF GROWTH IN THE

SIX COMMUNITIES

Population 
City Size Rate of Problem 
(1960) Growth 
Lowell 10,585 19.5 Pollution 
Teayston 11,059 26.8 Flooding/Pollution 
Jefferson 12,388 17.3 None 
Demain 16,847 5.4 Flooding 
Custer 22,968 7.0 Pollution 
Ashville 24,559 3.6 Pollution 
the third community has current problems of pollution and the fourth with no

current indications of flooding or pollution. The other set of communities

involved two cities, matched approximately in size (averaging 23,750).

Both of these cities are located on one of the Great Lakes and both are con­

fronted with serious water pollution problems in their immediate environmento

Both are relatively autonomous in that they are not part of a large neighboring

metropolitan area. While only one is a county seat, the other is clearly the

dominant city in the county in which it is located.
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Techniques Used to Identify the Community Leadership Pool

Since there are several ways in which community leaders can be identified,

the approach used here involved several steps. First, community knowledge­

ables were asked to identify individuals in each of the communities who were

influential in "general community affairs." In the four smaller communities,

these community knowledge ables were the county extension agent, the president

of the chamber of commerce, and the newspaper editor. In the larger communities,

the city attorney and the head of the largest union were included in addition*

From these original nominations, names of those who had been mentioned at

least twice were included on the initial list. In an attempt not to overlook

other power actors, the study was designed so that these reputed power actors

were also asked to name anyone else in the community that was influential.

If the mayor or the local newspaper editor were not included in the list, they

were automatically included in the leadership pool since our initial findings

indicated that these positions were important in the local system, regardless

of the abilities of the incumbents.

Using this as the sample base, a Leadership Pool Interview Schedule was

developed to obtain information relevant to the structure, distribution, and

exercise of power in the community, the perception and definition of general

community problems,, as well as specific water-related problems. A field

team interviewed these leaders in the six communities; the interviews ranged

from 45 minutes to almost four hours and averaged about an hour and a half.

The data in the following sections are based on these interviews.

The model presented previously was constructed on the assumption that

the structure of the community was a determinant of the nature, distribution,

and structure of power within the community. A general working hypothesis
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is that the structure and distribution of power among the leadership pool

will influence the nature of the community leadership's perceptions and

definition of local problems and, subsequently, the nature of this leadership's

proposals for ameliorative action. Illustrations of the measure of some

of the variables are shown below.

Empirical Description of Variables

(Figures 6 through 33 are found in Appendix)

Community Structural Variables

A. Population size and rate of growth (see figure 5)

B. Demographic heterogeneity (see figure 6)

C. Degree of economic autonomy (see figure 7)

D. Degree of governmental-political autonomy (see figure 8)

E. Level of organizational density (see figure 9)

F. Economic base (see figures 10 and 11)

G. Social class (see figure 12)

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

A. Size of the leadership pool (see figure 13)

B. Institutional dominance (see figures 14 and 15)

C. Social class composition of the leadership pool (see figure 16)

D. Legitimacy (see figure 17)

E« Cohesiveness (see figure 18)

F. Entrenchment (see figure 19)

G. Cosmopolitanism-Localism (see figures 20 and 21)
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Community Problem Dimensions

A.	 Number of different perceived problems (see figures 22 and 23)

B.	 Perceived seriousness of the problems (see figure 24)

C.	 Degree of consensus concerning the severity of the community problems

(see figure 3)

D.	 Defined possibility of local solution (see figure 25)

E.	 Degree of uniqueness in problem definitions (see figure 26)

F. Degree of clarity inherent in the problem definition (see figure 27)

Patterns of Community Action

A.	 Urgency or immediacy of instituting the ameliorative action (see figure 28)

B.	 Degree of institutional coordination required to successfully implement

the proposed ameliorative action (see figure 29)

C.	 Degree of public responsibility for action (see figure 30)

D.	 Degree of perceived relevance of local organizations (see figure 31)

E.	 Perceived possibility of "blockage11 (see figure 32)

F.	 Level of inactivity (see figure 33)

The complexity of testing the total model is great. In a preliminary

study on the four smaller communities, Wenger found that, of 143 propositions

between the sets of the four major dimensions, the directionality of 64*3

percent was supported. *•*• Two other aspects are explored further here.

Next, differences between two of the communities studied in their decision

making will be explored. Later, water resource problems will be considered

in the context of other community problems *

Decision Making and its Implementation

The advantage of collecting data on communities is that it can provide

a base line for observing certain subsequent decisions and the direction of
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these decisions. Base line data were collected on the four smaller communities,

Two years later, follow-up trips were taken to each of these communities and

the two members of the leadership pool who were most concerned with water-

related problems were re-interviewed. These interviews were relatively open-

ended in which the variety of community actions which had been initiated,

and/or completed during that two-year period were explored. In brief summary,

the activities within the four communities are as follows:

Lowell. New 16-inch water lines had been installed in order to handle

the communitiesf growing industrial needs. There was some indication that

there would be a future crisis in both the quantity and quality of water

available.

In addition, a completely new sewage treatment plant had been built to

serve the area. All funding for this project came through appropriations by

city council. No bonds were sold, nor was there state or federal aid.

Teayston. A 12-inch line had been completed to serve a new industrial

user and industrial water rates had been raised. Plans for a new waste-water

treatment facility had been drawn and approved by council but no funds had

been allocated nor were alternative funding plans being considered. Several

observers suggested that the treatment facility will not be implemented until

there is a crisis.

Jefferson. No actions had been taken on any aspect of water-related

problems within the past two years. It will be recalled that this was the

control community in the first four and was characterized by a lack of prob­

lems.

Demain. Certain technical changes had been made in the water system.

Old valves had continued to be replaced. Some new lines had been constructed
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to new industrial sites. Some new wells had been added to the system. A

rate increase was anticipated in 1972.

Ground had been broken for a new water treatment plant. The new facility-

costing almost $3 million, of which over half will come from federal funding.

The rate increase is designed to raise the city portion.

An interesting contrast is presented by the differences between Lowell

and Demain. In particular, it is interesting to attempt to focus on the

decision in Lowell to make major improvements in sewage treatment without

any outside-state and federal funding. By contrast, Demain made certain

improvements using a major portion of the funding from outside the community.

In the previous figures, data on comparisons on a number of dimensions between

Lowell and Demain can be observed.

Lowell and Demain tend to have somewhat similar institutional represen­

tation in their leadership pool (see Figure 15, Appendix), both having

business and industry as the dominant institution. Lowell shows a higher

social class composition in its leadership pool. In addition, other data

collected seems to indicate that Lowell had the most cohesive leadership

pool of the four smaller cities. The cohesiveness was expressed in the

sense of joining other power actors for lunch, having them as close friends,

and exchanging visits. By contrast, the leadership pool in Demain showed the

least cohesion (see Figure 18, Appendix).

Of most interest is the earlier contrast between Lowell and Demain on

the question of whether local community problems could be solved without

outside assistance. Of our four smaller communities, the leadership pool

perceives that 83*4 percent of the most important current problems could be

solved by the local community. Thus, the community is defined as a viable,
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problem-solving entity by the leadership pool. At the other extreme, only

33.3 percent of the problems perceived to exist in Demain are defined as

being solvable at the local level (see Figure 25, Appendix). In addition,

the power actors were asked if their proposed solutions to major problems

in the community were public or "private" concerns. Almost half of the action

proposals offered by the leadership pool in Demain were defined as purely

public, governmental concerns. By contrast, less than 17 percent of the

problems in Lowell were defined as public concerns.

In addition, in discussing their proposals for solving the major com­

munity problems, the power actors were asked if outside, non-local assistance

would be needed. The greatest degree of non-local involvement was defined

as being necessary in Demain. Of the total of 21 separate action proposals,

11 or 52.3 percent were defined as being either the combined concerns of both

local and non-local units or the primary responsibility of non-local agents.

At the other extreme, all of the proposals in Lowell were defined as being

primarily local concerns.

The differences between Lowell and Demain should suggest that the model

outlined previously has a degree of predictability. The leadership pool in

Lowell shewed the greatest degree of assurance that local community problems

could be solved without outside assistance. This collective definition of

primary responsibility within the local community was reflected in Lowell's

assumption of complete responsibility for development and financing of a

new sewage treatment plant.
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The Perception of Water Resource Problems in the Six Communities

13

In a previous paper, certain aspects of the community perception of

water resource problems were reported in the four smaller cities, Here3 with

the addition of the two larger cities, we will discuss any changes that need

to be made in that previous interpretation.

One of the major research questions was to determine if the power actors

in the communities were aware of existing water-related problems. If a problem

is not salient to those in the leadership pool, it is unlikely that they will

utilize their social power and power-relevant resources to solve it. To deter­

mine the salience of water-related problems, the power actors were asked: (1)

what they considered to be the two major problems in the community in the past

five years and (2) what they considered to be the major current problem. As

Figure 34 (Appendix) indicates, water problems were not particularly salient

to the power actors within these communities. A total of 291 problems were

cited. Of these only 12 or 2.4 percent were water related* In the larger

cities, however, there was a higher degree of salience than in the four smaller

cities.

A more sensitive indicator of salience is the percent of the leadership

pool which cited these problems at least once. Figure 35 (Appendix) presents

the percent of each leadership pool which cited water-related problems. In

both of the larger cities, a significantly larger percent of the power actors

do cite water problems than in the smaller cities. In part, this difference

may be somewhat exaggerated by the smaller number of power actors.

Another aspect of problem definition was obtained when the various

power actors were presented a list of problems and asked to judge whether the
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specific problems were (1) very serious, (2) fairly serious, or (3) not

serious in the community. The list included the following problems: (1)

industrial and economic development; (2) housing, building and urban renewal;

(3) race and ethnic relations; (4) educational concerns; (5) health; (6)

culture; (7) public improvements and services; (8) social welfare, crime,

and delinquency; (9) water problems; and (10) recruitment of public servants.

In this particular format, the leaders tended to rank water problems more

serious than the overall rank of the others.

One factor important for problem solving is the consensus within the

leadership pool as to the degree of seriousness of particular problems. Conflict

and disagreement over the degree of severity of local problems is likely to

impede problem solving. To measure this dimension, an Index of Consensus was

developed. ^  This index is a measure of dispersion and has a value from .000

to 1,000. If each problem was rated identically by each power actor, there

would be complete agreement or consensus regarding the severity of the problem

and the index would be 1.000. A value of .430 represents 43 percent of the

maximum possible consensus. The results of this analysis are presented in

Figure 36 (Appendix). In general, they indicate that there is less consensus

evidenced by the leadership pools concerning the water problems than there is

concerning other community problems. In one of the larger cities, Custer,

the consensus on water is almost the same as for the general problems. In

the rest of the cities, there is less consensus on water problems than for

general community problems.

Another factor which was studied was the degree to which the power actors

defined the local community as being able to solve a problem by itself at

the local level. The leadership pool in each of the communities was asked a
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series of questions concerning the solution of problems which they had defined

as being most important. Figure 37 (Appendix) indicates that the power actors

in the six communities do not perceive the local community as being able to

solve the water-related problems by itself. The degree of local solvability

seen in water problems is much lower than the degree seen for other major

community problems. In only one community, Custer, is there any confidence in

the ability of the community to solve its problems. Several years ago a

construction of an extensive water purification system was undertaken; the

facility (an example of substantial federal funding) was nearing completion

at the time of our research. The community anticipated the beginning of the

plantfs operations. The end result is that while Guster sees a water-related

problem as existent, the problem is looked upon as, essentially, solved. The

two larger communities, then, show the least and the most confidence in their

ability to solve water-related problems.

Certain community problems require the coordination of many different

institutional areas to implement action proposals. If successful implementation

is contingent upon the involvement and coordination of many different institu­

tional areas, the community is faced with a complex activity. If, however, a

solution can be undertaken by one or two institutions, the problems inherent

in the coordination of many units can be minimized. Each power actor was

asked which institutions should be involved in action and seeking solutions

to specific community problems. Those proposals which involved three or

more institutional areas were classified as requiring coordination. The

results presented in Figure 38 (Appendix) suggest that power actors perceive

that the solution to water problems within these communities does not require
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extensive institutional coordination. The two larger cities are at the

extremes -- Custer the least and Ashville the most.

In discussing possible solutions to community problems, the power actors

within the six communities were asked if their proposed solutions to problems

were (1) private, (2) public, or (3) a mixed private and public responsibility.

The percent of water and general problems which were defined as solely "public11

concerns is presented in Figure 39 (Appendix). It indicates that solutions to

water-related problems are seen as being almost the exclusive concern of the

public sector. These findings are reinforced by the addition of the two larger

cities.

One final dimension will be included here. The power actors were given

a list of 20 local organizations and offices and asked to rank each organization's

relevance to action proposals. In general, the rank order for both general

and for water problems was similar, but local governmental representatives were

seen as being more essential to water problems than to other issues. In the

larger cities, the newspapers, the chamber of commerce, and local radio and TV

seemingly were considered more important to water problems than they were in

smaller communities. In addition there are indications that in the larger

communities, the labor unions were much more important both for general community

problems and for water-related problems.

Summary

In general, the addition of two larger communities does not basically

affect the previous findings. Among community leaders in six different com­

munities, water-related problems were characterized by low salience and by

low consensus. In seeking solutions, these leaders see water-related problems
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as being less likely to be solved at the local community level, although one of f

our large communities was an exception to this pattern. They also see water-

related problems as requiring a relatively low level of community coordination

and as being primarily the responsibility of the public sector. Local govern­

mental leaders were seen as being more important in problem solving than they

were in other community problems.
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Figure 6

DEMOGRAPHIC HETEROGENEITY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Percent Percent Heterogeneity 
City Non-white Foreign- Total Rank 
Born 
Lowell .3 1.2 1.5 6 
Teayston 2.9 .6 3.5 4 
Jefferson 3.9 .5 4.4 3 
Demain 1.3 .9 2.2 5 
Custer 4.0 4.1 8.1 2 
Ashville 5.0 5.9 10.9 1 
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Figure 7

THE DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AUTONOMY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

* Data not available

Percent of Local

Industry that is

Absentee-Owned

42.8

44.4

37.8

55.0

*

*

Percent of Labor

Force Working

Outside City

15.1

17.2

14.0

6.7

12.2

3.7

-120­

Figure 8

THE DEGREE OF GOVERNMENTAL-POLITICAL AUTONOMY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Per Capita Number of Percent of Residents 
City Government Government Budget from Full-time 
Expenditure Functions State-Federal Gov. Empl. 
Lowell 96.17 15 22.7 130.7 
Teays ton 103.82 17 11.6 73.2 
Jefferson 48.19 13 26.2 302.1 
Demain 63.27 13 21.9 160.5 
Custer 81.6 12 21.3 * 
Ashville 85.3 14 18.5 335.0 
* Data not available 
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Figure 9

THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL DENSITY

IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Number of Local

Organizations

125

158

116

91

*

Residents Per

Organization

84.6

69,9

106.7

185.1

•k

-k

Organizational

Density Rank

2

1

3

4

*

* Data not available
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Figure 10 
TOP FIVE EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES 
Lowell
Category Percent
 Teayston
 Category Percent
 Jefferson
 Category Percent
 Demain
 Category Percent
 Custer Ashville 
 Category Percent Category Percent 
Manuf'g 37.7 Manuf'g 32.1 Manuf'g 28.6 Manuf'g 24.8 Manuf'g 42.2 Manuf'g 28.1 
Ret'l Td 13.2 Const'n 11.4 Ret'l Td 12.9 Ret!l Td 13.9 Ret1! Td 9.0 Retfl Td 10.9 
Educat'n 5,0 Retfl td 9.2 Constf n 6.9 Educat'n 11.5 Constf n 4.0 RR Railway 10.7 
Express 
Constr'n 3.9 Pub Adm 4,7 Eat&Dr 5.6 Const'n 5.8 
Pub Adm 4.0 Educat'n 4.0 
Whol Td 3.5 Educat'n 4.6 Whol Td 4.3 Eat&Dr 4.1 
Educat'n 3.0 Util&Sanit!y 3.8 
Total 63.3 Total 62.0 Total 58.3 Total 60.1 
Total 62.2 Total 57.6 
F i g u r e 11 
THE DEGREE OF ECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES 
Percentage of Labor Force in Major Local Employment Categories 
City In Top Two In Top Three In Top Four Diversity 
Rank 
Lowell 50.9 55.9 59.8 6 
Teayston 43.5 52.7 57.4 4 
Jefferson 41.5 48.4 54oO 2 
Demain 38.7 50.2 56.0 3 
Custer 51.2 55.2 59.2 5 
Ashville 39.0 49.7 53.7 1 
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City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

State

Figure 12

MEDIAN EDUCATION AND INCOME

FOR THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Median

Education

11.4

10.8

10.9

11.7

9,7

11.0

10c 9

Median

Income

5,592 
5,499 
5,067 
5,151 
6,081 
5,663 
6,531 
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Figure 13

SIZE OF LEADERSHIP POOL IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Number of 
City Power Actors Rank 
Lowell 18 3 
Teayston 17 4 
Jefferson 20 2 
Demain 21 1 
Custer 11 5 
Ashville 9 6 
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Figure 14 
INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE 
LEADERSHIP POOL IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES 
Institution Lowell Teayston Jefferson Demain Custer Ashville 
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent No, Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Government 5 27.8 7 41.2 2 10.0 6 28.6 3 27.3 3 33.3 
Bus & Ind 8 44.4 6 35.3 11 55.0 9 42.9 4 36.3 2 22.2 
Education 1 5.6 1 5.9 3 15.0 2 9.5 1 9.2 1 11.1 
Media 1 5.6 2 11.8 1 5.0 2 9.5 1 9.2 1 11.1 
Professions 1 5.6 1 5.9 1 5.0 1 4.8 1 9.2 0 0.0 
Finance 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 10.0 1 4.8 0 0.0 1 11.1 
Religion 2 11.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 9.2 1 11.1 
Figure 15

THE DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL DOMINANCE

IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

Dominant Percent in Percent

City Institution Dominant Difference* Rank

Institution

Lowell Bus & Ind 44.4 +5.5 2

Teayston Gov 41.2 -5.9 6

Jefferson Bus & Ind 55.0 +30.0 1

Demain Bus 6c Ind 42.9 +4.8 3

Custer Bus 6c Ind 36.3 -0.2 5

Ashville Gov 33.3 0.0 4

^Percent Difference is computed by summing the combined percentage

totals of the second and third most represented institutions and then

subtracting this total from the percent in the dominant institution
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Figure 16

SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION AND RANK

OF THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Median

North-Hatt

Score

82

80

79

81

82

79

Median

Years of

Education

16.9

16.8

15.1

15.7

15.6

16.8

16.1

Social

Class

Rank

1

2

5

3

4

2

Sample Average 81
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Figure 17

DEGREE OF LEGITIMACY IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

Number of Percent of 
City Legitimate Legitimacy Legitimacy 
Power Actors in Pool Rank 
Lowell 6 33.3 4 
Teayston 9 52.9 2 
Jefferson 6 30.3 5 
Demain 9 42.8 3 
Custer 2 18.2 6 
Ashville 4 57.1 1 
Average 6 37.4 
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Figure 18

DEGREE OF COHESIVENESS IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

Average Average Average Average 
City Percent Percent Percent Total Weighted Cohesive 
Lunch Friendship Visit Percent Score Rank 
Lowell 24.2 30.1 20.1 74.4 32.2 1 
Jefferson 31.0 30.7 7.6 69.3 29.7 2 
Demain 16.2 27.5 5.5 49.2 29.9 3 
Teayston 20.0 26.4 7.5 53.9 25.5 4 
Custer * * * 
Ashville * * * * 
* Data not available 
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Figure 19

LEVEL OF ENTRENCHMENT IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

Mean

City Mean Years in L_, *

Age Community

Lowell 48.3 25.1 .519

Teayston 45.0 35.1 .700

Jefferson 53.4 28.3 .529

Demain 50.7 33.7 .665

Custer 55.0 36.4 1.51

Ashville 55.0 54.2 1.01

_

* Index of Entrenchment is L =  ^ 3 where 1^  = the Index of Entrenchment;

Ma = the mean age of the leadership pool; and Myc = the mean number of years

spent in the community by the leadership pool.
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Figure 20

LEVELS OF LOCAL AND NON-LOCAL INTERESTS IN

THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City State National Local County International

Lowell 2.50 2.5 1 4.0 5.0 
Teayston 2.50 4.0 1 2.5 5.0 
Jefferson 3.00 4.0 1 2.0 5.0 
Demain 2.00 3.5 1 3.5 5.0 
Custer 2.56 3.33 1. 56 2.78 4.78 
Ashville 3.33 2.5 1. 16 3.17 4.84 
Average Rank 2.65 3.3 1 2.95 4.91 
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Figure 21

DEGREE OF COSMOPOLITANISM

IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

Percent

City Mean Cosmopolitan

Lowell 3.33 33.3

Teayston 2.68 31.2

Jefferson 2.50 10.6

Demain 2.87 28.6

Custer 2.50 *

Ashville 3.50 *

Average 2.88

* Data not available
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Figure 22

THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PERCEIVED PROBLEMS AND

THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PERCEIVED PROBLEMS PER POWER

ACTOR IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Number of Number of 
City Different Different Problems 
Problems Per Power Actor 
Lowell 12 .667

Teayston 12 .750

Jefferson 12 .632

Demain 14 .667

Custer 6 .545

Ashville 6 .666

City Average 10.3 .651
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Figure 23 
THE RANK ORDERING OF THE SIX MOST SALIENT PROBLEMS 
IN EACH OF THE SIX COMMUNITIES 
Rank 
Teayston 
Problem Times Cited 
Lowell 
Problem Times Cited 
Demain 
Problem Times Cited 
Jefferson 
Problem Times ( ]ite< 
1 Pub. Improv't 
6c Services 
12 Industry & 
Econ Devel 
13 Urban 
Renewal 
15 Education 14 
2 Education 9 Education 12 Pub, Improv't 
6c Services 
11 Pub. Improv't 
6c Services 
9 
3 Finances 7 Pub, Improv't 
& Services 
6 Education 9 Finances 9 
4 Recruitm't of 
Pub Servants 
6 Social 
Welfare 
6 Finances 8 Industry & 
Econ Devel 
8 
5 Planning 4 Finances 5 Industry 6c 
Econ Devel 
4 Housing 6c 
Building 
7 
6 Airport 2 Recruitm't of 
Pub Servants 
3 Community 
Apathy 
3 Urban 
Renewal 
3 
Figure 23 continued

Guster Ashville

Rank Problem Times Cited Problem Times Cited

1 Education 
2 Water 
3 Air Pollution 
4 Public 
Improvements 
5 Housing 
6 Economic 
Development 
6 Water 3 
5 Education 3 
4 Housing 2 
2 Air Pollution 1 
2 Economic 1 
Development 
1 Recruitment of 1 
Pub Servants 
Figure 24

THE DEFINED DEGREE OF SEVERITY INHERENT IN

TEN SELECTED PROBLEMS FOR THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent

Very Serious

11.1

24.3

12.6

18.1

41.6

25.0

22.3

Degree of Severity

Percent

Fairly Serious

37.2

38.1

36.8

34.7

41.6

58.3

41.1

Percent

Not Serious

51.6

37.5

50.5

47.1

16.7

16.7

36.6
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Figure 25

THE DEGREE OF LOCAL SOLUTION INHERENT

IN THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Deraain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent of Problems

Perceived to be

Locally Solvable

83.4

43.7

63.2

33.3

56o5

57.4

56,2

Rank

1

5

2

6

4

3
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Figure 26 
THE DEGREE OF UNIQUENESS INHERENT IN THE 
PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOLS 
City
Percent of Problems 
 Perceived to be Unique Rank 
Lowell 11.1 5 
Teayston
Jefferson
 12.5
 15.8
 4 
2 
Demain 14.3 3 
Custer 22.2 1 
Ashville 0.0 6 
Average 12.6 
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Figure 27

THE DEGREE OF CLARITY INHERENT IN

THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent of Problems

For Which No Cause

Was Imputed

16.6

6.3

5.3

9o5

0.0

0.0

Percent of Problems

For Which Specific

Cause Was Imputed

60.0

26.7

33.3

31.6

44.4

33.3

38.2

Rank

1

5

3

4

2

3
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Figure 28

THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF URGENCY INHERENT

IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent

Urgent

38.8

87.6

57.8

57.1

0.0

16.8

43.0

Percent

Semi-Urgent

27.7

6.2

31.5

28.5

33.3

33.3

26.7

Percent

Not Urgent

33.3

6.2

10.5

14.2

66.7

50.0

30.1
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Figure 29

THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION

INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Percent Requiring Percent Not Requiring

City Coordination Coordination

Lowell 44*4 55-5

Teayston 12.5 87.5

Jefferson 31.5 68.4

Demain 33.3 66«6

Custer 33.3 66.6

Ashville 28.6 71.4

Average 32.2 69.2
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Figure 30

THE PERCENTAGE OF "PUBLIC" RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT

IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Percent of Problems Defined

City As "Public" Concerns Rank

Lowell 16.7 6

Teayston 31.2 4

Jefferson 26.3 5

Demain 47.6 2

Custer 55.6 1

Ashville 42.8 3

Average 36.5
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Figure 31

THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL RELEVANCE

INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent

Essential

41.9

39.6

43.4

52.8

43.3

45.8

44.4

Percent

Important

27.5

26.2

27.6

27.0

36.6

33.3

29.7

Percent

Not Important

30.5

34.0

28.9

20.0

19.4

20.0

25.6
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Figure 32

THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED "BLOCKAGE" INHERENT

IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Love11

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent

Blockage By

Individuals

33.3

12.5

31.5

47.6

44.5

33.3

33.8

Percent

Blockage By

Groups

66.6

50.0

73.6

47.6

44.5

50.0

55.4

Average

Percent

By Either

50.0

31.3

52.5

47.6

44.5

44.1

45.0
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Figure 33 
THE LEVEL OF INACTIVITY INHERENT 
IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES 
City
Percent of Problems 
 for Which No Ameliorative
Activity Has Been Undertaken 
 Rank 
Lowell 5,50 6 
Teayston
Jefferson
 31.20
 15.70
 2 
3 
Demain 9.50 5 
Custer 11.11 4 
Ashville 33.33 1 
Average 12.1 
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Figure 34

THE SALIENCE OF WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS

TO THE POWER ACTORS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Total

Number of

Perceived

Problems

54

48

57

63

48

21

291

Number

Citing Water

Problems

2

2

0

1

4

3

12

Percent

3.7

4-2

0.0

1.6

8.3

14.2
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Figure 35

THE PERCENT OF THE POWER ACTORS IN THE SIX

COMMUNITIES WHO CITED WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS

AS IMPORTANT COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Number of Number Citing 
City Power Actors Water Problems Perce 
Lowell 18 2 11.1 
Teayston 16 2 12.5 
Jefferson 19 0 0.0 
Demain 21 1 4.6 
Custer 9 4 44.4 
Ashville 7 3 43.8 
Average 15 2 19.4 
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Figure 36 
A COMPARISON OF THE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS EVIDENCED 
BY EACH LEADERSHIP POOL CONCERNING THE SEVERITY OF 
WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES 
City 
Water Index 
of Consensus 
Water 
Rank 
General Index 
of Consensus 
General 
Rank 
Lowell .250 5 .367 4 
Teayston .000 6 .270 5 
Jefferson .333 1 .392 3 
O 
I 
Demain 
Custer 
.286 
.257 
2 
3 
.450 
.250 
1 
6 
Ashville .250 4 .450 2 
Average .229 .363 
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Figure 37

A COMPARISON OF THE DEGREE OF LOCAL SOLVABILITY INHERENT IN THE PROBLEM

DEFINITIONS OF WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Percent of Water Percent of General

City Problems Defined Water Problems Defined As General

As Being Locally Rank Being Locally Rank

Solvable Solvable

Lowell 50.0 2 83.4 1

Teayston 7.1 4 43.7 5

Jefferson 28.5 3 63.2 2

I

Demain 4.7 5 33.3 6

Custer 75.0 1 56.5 4

Ashville 0.0 6 57.4 3

Average 27.7 56.2

Figure 38

A COMPARISON OF THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL

COORDINATION INHERENT IN THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO

WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Ln	 Teayston

Jefferson

Demain

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent of Water

Problems Requiring

Coordination

5.5

6.2

5.2

14.0

0.0

28.6

9.9

Water

Rank

4

3

5

2

6

1

Percent of General

Problems Requiring

Coordination

44.4

42.5

31.5

33.3

33.3

28.6

35.3

General

Rank

1

2

5

3

4

6

Figure 39

A COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE OF "PUBLIC11 RESPONSIBILITY

INHERENT IN THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO WATER AND

GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City

Lowell

Teayston

Jefferson

ui Demam

Custer

Ashville

Average

Percent of Water

Problems Defined as

Public Concerns

72.2

68.7

89.4

90.4

66.6

71.5

76.4

Water

Rank

3

5

2

1

6

4

Percent of General

Problems Defined As

Public Concerns

16.7

31.3

26.3

47.6

55.6

42.8

36.7

General

Rank

6

4

5

2

1

3

